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The American conception of retirement has received a number of
significantly jarring assaults in recent years.1 Employers have increasingly
shifted the investment risk of funding retirement to their employees by switching
from so-called "traditional" defined benefit plans that promise retirees a
predictable paycheck for life to defined contribution arrangements that provide
no such assurances. 2 Other employers have frozen their traditional pension plans
or otherwise terminated their employees' ability to accumulate further credits
toward retirement.3 Even President George W. Bush added to the general anxiety
about income in retirement by an extended campaign in 2005 that suggested that
the federal government's venerable program for funding retirement-Social
Security-was hopelessly outmoded and headed toward bankruptcy.
4
This Article examines a source of retirement anxiety that has received far
less attention but is of paramount importance for prospective and current retirees
alike-namely, health insurance in retirement. Indeed, the presence of retiree
health insurance is one of the most significant factors determining when people
choose to leave the compensated workforce, 5 especially if declining health is one
1. See generally Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on
Retirement, 12 ELDER L.J. 245 (2004).
2. See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 ARIZ.
L. REV. 53 (2004). See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT (2006); ALICIA H.
MUNNELL ET AL., WHY HAVE SOME STATES INTRODUCED DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS? (2008),
available at http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Briefs/slp-3.pdf, ED\\ ARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS
OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA
(2007).
3. See, e.g., Steven D. Jones, Pensions Likely To Stay Dying Breed, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29,
2006, at C3, Ellen E. Schultz, Charles Forelle & Theo Francis, IBM To Freeze Pension Program in
'08, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006, at A3; Ellen E. Schultz, Charles Forelle & Theo Francis, Forecast:
More Pension Freezes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2006, at C1; John D. Stoll, GM To Freeze Pension
Plans of White-Collar Workers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2006, at A10.
4. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 41 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DoC. 126, 128 (Feb. 2, 2005); see also Richard L. Kaplan, The Security of Social
Security Benefits and the President's Proposal, ELDERLAw REP., Apr. 2005, at 1.
5. See Paul Fronstin, Retirement Patterns and Employee Benefits. Do Benefits Matter?, 39
GERONTOLOGIST 37 (1999); see also David M. Blau & Donna B. Gilleskie, Retiree Health
Insurance and Labor Force Behavior of Older Men in the 1990s, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 64
(2001); Jeannette Rogowski & Lynn Karoly, Health Insurance and Retirement Behavior: Evidence
from the Health and Retirement Survey. 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 529 (2000); Erin Strumpf,
Presentation at 12th Annual National Research Service Award (NRSA) Trainees Research
Conference The Decline in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance for Retirees and Its Impact on
Older Americans (June 24, 2006), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/fund/training/strumpftxt.htm.
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of the reasons that they are considering retirement. 6 As an important recent study
concluded, without such insurance, "current employees will have strong financial
incentives to work longer and retire later."7 Such incentives might therefore
impact employment prospects for younger workers if older workers delay their
retirement. Thus, this issue is enormously important to anyone connected to the
U.S. workplace, regardless of age.
Since 1965, the federal government has operated a health insurance program
called Medicare 8 that specifically covers older Americans. 9 This program,
however, has major gaps in its service coverage, ranging from specified
deductibles for hospital admissions to 20% co-payment obligations regarding
doctors' fees and the like.l° In 2003, Congress undertook a determined effort to
patch Medicare's most glaring coverage gap-namely, prescription
medications-in its highly publicized and roundly criticized Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act.11 Notwithstanding this
legislation, a prominent financial services company predicts that the typical
retired couple will incur over $215,000 of medical expenses not covered by
Medicare, 12 and that estimate does not even consider the cost of long-term care in
6. See RUTH HELMAN ET AL., EBRI 2008 RECENT RETIREES SURVEY: REPORT OF FINDINGS 5-6
(Employee Benefit Research Inst., Issue Brief No. 319, 2008), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI IB 07-2008.pdf (among surveyed engineers and
technicians in the aerospace and defense industries, 46% cited health as an extremely or very
important factor in their retirement decision, and 69% indicated that the availability of health
insurance was similarly important in determining their "ability to afford retirement").
7. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEWITT Assocs., RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS EXAMINED:
FINDINGS FROM THE KAISER/HEWITT 2006 SURVEY ON RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS 34 (2006)
[hereinafter KAISER/HEWITT SURVEY], available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload'7587.pdf:
see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RETIREMENT DECISIONS: FEDERAL POLICIES OFFER
MIXED SIGNALS ABOUT WHEN TO RETIRE 32 (2007), available at http:/iwww.gao.govicgi-bin/getrpt
?GAO-07-753 (noting that "'workers who have access to health insurance in retirement are
substantially more likely to retire before becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65 than those
without such access"). This study found that men with access to pre-Medicare health insurance
were 86% more likely to retire before age sixty-five, and women were 1390 o more likely. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000). See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN.
ElDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 64-95, 103-08 (4th ed. 2006) (explaining the major features of
Medicare).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 426(a)(1) (2000).
10. Sec FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 64-82.
11. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). Sec generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note
8, at 85-91 (explaining the major features of Medicare's prescription drug benefit).
12. Sce News Release, Fidelity Investments Estimates S215,000 Needed To Cover Retiree
Health Care Costs, March 27, 2007, available at http://content.members.fidelity.com/
InsideFidelity/fullStory/1,,7448,00.html1 see also PAUL FRONSTIN, SAVIN(GS NEEDED To FUND
HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE I XPENSES IN RITIREMENT 13 (Employee Benefit Research
Inst., Issue Brief No. 295, 2006), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI-IB 07-2
4
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an assisted living facility or a nursing home. 13
To address the numerous gaps in Medicare, many employers have for some
time provided supplementary health benefits to their retirees.14 Such retiree
health benefits preceded the 2003 Medicare enactment regarding prescription
drugs by several decades and continue to provide important coverage. Is Retiree
health benefits are especially important for those who retire before reaching age
sixty-five, generally the qualifying age for Medicare. For these pre-Medicare
retirees, employer-provided health insurance may be their only protection from
financial disaster. These so-called "early" retirees often find obtaining quality
individual health insurance forbiddingly expensive, if not completely impossible,
due to pre-existing medical conditions and other underwriting criteria. 16
Yet despite their importance, retiree health benefits for both pre-Medicare
and Medicare-eligible retirees have been under persistent assault on several
fronts. Some employers have initiated or substantially raised the monthly
premiums that they charge retirees for health benefits,' 7 without regard to these
retirees' often-fixed pension income-effectively reducing these retirees'
spendable retirement income by considerable amounts. 18 Indeed, one recent
report found that median premium contributions by retirees had more than
quadrupled over the past decade. 1 9 Moreover, a recent survey of employers with
at least 1000 employees found that 80% of such employers plan to increase
20further the contributions required of retirees. Some companies have increased
0061.pdf [hereinafter FRONSTIN, Issue Brief No. 295] (calculating that S295,000 would be needed
for a sixty-five-year-old couple retiring in 2006 who live to average life expectancies). For an
extended simulation effort to determine the funds needed for health care costs in retirement, see
PAUL FRONSTIN, S \VINGS NEEDED To FUND HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE EXPENSES IN
RETIREMENT: FINDINGS FROM A SIMULATION MODEL (Employee Benefit Research Inst., Issue Brief
No. 317, 2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI IB 05-20081 .pdf.
13. See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning's Greatest Gap: Funding Long-
Term Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407 (2007) (examining the nature and cost of long-term
care, particularly when such care is provided in an institutional setting).
14. See MADELON LUBIN FINKEL & HIRSCH S. RUCHLIN, THE HEALTH CARE BENEFITS OF
RETIREES 1 (1991).
15. See id. at 62.
16. See inIra text accompanying notes 337-340.
17. See K AisERIHEWITT SURVEY, supra note 7, at 19-21.
18. See, e.g., Robert L. Rose, Firms' Attempts To Cut Health Benefits Break Calm of
Retirement, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1993, at Al; Ellen E. Schultz. Companies Transform Retiree-
Medical Plans into Source of Profits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2000, at Al.
19. RICHARD W. JOHNSON, WHAT HAPPENS TO HEALTH BENEFITS AFTER RETIREMENT? 4
(2007), available at http: /crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Briefs/wob-7.pdf.
20. KAISER/HF\V ITT SURVEY, supra note 7, at 21. In addition, 40°0 of employers are very or
somewhat likely to increase retirees' cost-sharing requirements, and 30% are very or somewhat
likely to raise the limit on retirees' out-of-pocket expenses. Id.
5
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retirees' cost-sharing obligations or applicable limits on out-of-pocket
expenditures,21 while others have capped their contributions to the cost of these
plans,22 leaving retirees to bear the full cost of future medical inflation. Still other
employers have terminated their retiree health benefits outright,23 leaving the
affected retirees-especially pre-Medicare retireeS24 -- exposed to the financial
hardships of a major illness or accident. As employers struggle in the current
economic crisis, these trends are likely to accelerate further.
This Article begins by tracing the decline in retiree health insurance
coverage over the past several decades and setting forth some of the reasons for
this dramatic decline. The Article then analyzes the legal posture of retirees who
have lost the health benefits that they expected to have in retirement. Finding
surprisingly little legal relief for these retirees' dashed expectations, the Article
then considers various self-help options currently available to retirees before
examining a major public policy alternative-namely, expanding Medicare
eligibility to cover retirees younger than sixty-five years of age.
I. DECLINING SCOPE OF RETIREE HEALTH COVERAGE
Retiree health benefits originated as an extension of employer-provided
health insurance for employees, a phenomenon that itself began largely as an
employer response to wage controls imposed by Congress during World War 1125
and was later canonized by a tax law provision that excluded such insurance from
employees' taxable income.26 The pervasiveness of industrial unions during this
period further contributed to the expansion of various employer-provided job
27benefits, most especially health insurance. As an outgrowth of this
21. See id. at 19; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS:
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED BENEFITS MAY BE VULNERABLE TO FURTHER EROSION 10 (2001).
22. KAISER/HEWITT SURVEY, supra note 7, at 13-14 (among employers with at least 1000
employees and that offer retiree health benefits, 46% have caps on their plans for pre-Medicare
retirees and 50% have caps for Medicare-eligible retirees); see also PAUL FRONSTIN, THE IMPACT OF
THE EROSION OF RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS ON WORKERS AND RETIREES 6 (Employee Benefit
Research Inst., Issue Brief No. 279, 2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/
0305ib.pdf.
23. See FRONSTIN, Issue Brief No. 295, supra note 12, at 9, 11.
24. See AARP PUB. POL'Y INST., DATA DIGEST: HEALTH COVERAGE AMONG 50- TO 64-YEAR-
OLDS 3 (2007), available at http:i assets.aarp.orgirgcenter/health/ dd155 coverage.pdf (reporting
that the number of retirees aged fifty to sixty-four without health insurance increased more than
25% between 2000 and 2005).
25. See Hi.s'to, of Health Insurance Benefits, FACTS FROM EBRI (Employee Benefit Research
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2002, at 1, available at http://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/
index.c fm? fa-0302fact.
26. I.R.C. § 106 (2008).
27. See Thomas C. Buchmueller, John Dinardo & Robert G. Valletta, Union Effects on Health
IX:2 (2009)
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phenomenon, employers agreed to maintain such health insurance after their
workers retired, an especially valuable benefit during the period prior to the
enactment of Medicare. 28 Employers were generally amenable to providing these
benefits, because health care costs were not expensive, life expectancy was rather
limited, and no actual expenditures were required until many years into the
future.29 As Americans began living longer in retirement, however, these benefits
became much more expensive at the same time that they became more valuable
to covered retirees.
But far more than general retirement trends was at play here. First, the cost
of health care has increased in recent years, often dwarfing increases in general
inflation.3 ° Second, exogenous events, particularly pronouncements from
accounting regulators, have forced employers to project and report the
anticipated future expense of their retiree health benefit obligations. This Part
considers both of these factors.
A. Rising Cost of Health Care
Health care costs consume an ever-increasing share of this country's gross
domestic product 3' and are a perennial source of anxiety for many Americans.
32
Health care reform proposals of varying scope have been a central issue in U.S.
presidential election campaigns since the implosion of President Clinton's 1993
proposal,33 focusing particularly on the plight of those Americans who have no
Insurance Provision and Coverage in the United States, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 610 (2002).
28. See generally THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (2d ed. 2000)
(discussing the historical and political context in which Medicare developed).
29. See generally FINKEL & RUCHLIN, supra note 14, at 62; G. Lawrence Atkins, The
Employer Role in Financing Health Care for Retirees, in PROVIDING HEALTH CARE BENEFITS IN
RETIREMENT 100, 108 (Judith F. Mazo, Anna M. Rappaport & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1994)
[hereinafter PROVIDING HEALTH CARE].
30. Professor Gruber has recently concluded that "the rapid rise in health care costs has been
driven by quality-improving technological change." Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in
the United States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 603 (2008); see also Paul Krugman & Robin Wells,
The Health Care Crisis and What To Do About It, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2006, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18802 (agreeing that "new medical technology" is the principal
factor driving health care costs higher).
31. See Krugman & Wells, supra note 30 (noting that the percent of U.S. gross domestic
product spent on health care rose from 5.2% in 1960 to 16% in 2004).
32. See, e.g., GARY CLAXTON ET AL., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY 1
(2006), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/upload/7527.pdf; Sudeep Reddy, Census
Income Report Feeds Health-Care Debate, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2007, at A3.
33. Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993). See generally THEDA
SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST
GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS (1996).
7
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health insurance. And in 2007, Michael Moore's controversial movie, Sicko,3 4
tapped into the concerns and financial fears harbored by even those Americans
who have health insurance.
Employers, for their part, have been trying to assert control over the ever-
burgeoning cost of the health insurance that they provide to their employees.
Some companies have increased employees' monthly premiums, co-payments,
deductibles, and other cost-sharing mechanisms, and some employers have
reduced service coverage or ceased providing health insurance to their employees
altogether. Certain employers, however, have taken a different approach,
instituting so-called "wellness" programs that seek to implement preventative
approaches, including lifestyle changes like regular exercise, smoking cessation,
and weight loss regimens.35 Others have lowered or even eliminated the
employee cost of prescription medications to ensure that these pharmaceuticals
are taken regularly and that expensive hospitalization episodes are thereby
prevented.36 The latest attempt by policymakers to make employees more
responsible for their own health care costs and perhaps more cost-conscious in
this regard is the introduction of Health Savings Accounts.37 These arrangements
pair a pre-tax account from which an employee can spend as she chooses on
"qualified medical expenses"38 with a high-deductible health insurance policy
that covers catastrophic expenses.39
In the context of these conflicting trends, there has been a decline in
employees with employment-based health insurance. According to recent data
from the Employee Benefit Research Institute, only 64.2% of Americans aged
eighteen to sixty-four years have some form of employer-provided health
insurance, a number that has declined from 69.3% as recently as 2000.40 This
trend has persisted despite the presence of an unlimited income tax exclusion that
34. SICKO (The Weinstein Company 2007).
35. See, e.g., Howard M. Leichter, "Evil Habits" and "Personal Choices": Assigning
Responsibility for Health in the 20th Century, 81 MILBANK Q. 603, 609 (2003); Kris Maher,
Companies are Closing Doors on Job Applicants Who Smoke, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2004, at B6.
36. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, A Radical Prescription, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2004, at R3.
37. See I.R.C. § 223 (2008). Se generally Richard L. Kaplan, U ho's Afraid of PersonaI
Responsibility, Health Savings Accounts and the Future of Anerican Health Car, 36 MN'GEORGE
L. Riv. 535 (2005), Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care
Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777 (2006).
38. I.R.C. § 223(d)(2)(A) (2008).
39. Id. § 223(c)(2). Sce i'a Subsection III.A.3 (outlining more information on Health
Savings Accounts).
40. PAUL FRONSTIN, SOURCIS OF HEALrH INSURANCE AN) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCIH 2007 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 7 (Employee Benefit
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applies to such insurance, 41 a reality that suggests that the tax law may not be the
deus ex machina that virtually all would-be health reformers seem to think it is. 42
That is, health reformers from all points on the political spectrum seem to believe
that changing the current tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance is
essential public policy, 4 3 without noting that despite the current law's alleged
generosity, the prevalence of employer-provided health insurance continues to
decline.
In any case, retiree health coverage is particularly vulnerable. Employers
who diminish or terminate their coverage of employees' health care costs risk
losing employees to employers who provide better benefits. Affected workers
who do not leave, moreover, might complain, reduce their output in protest, or
even organize a debilitating strike against their employer if they are represented
by a labor union. But retirees faced with similar cutbacks enjoy no such leverage
over their former employers. Accordingly, when employers consider various
strategies to lower their costs of providing health insurance, the first group to be
targeted is often former employees who are now retired.44
This last point is particularly salient in light of the changing composition of
the American workplace. Manufacturing jobs represent an ever-diminishing
share of U.S. employment in favor of financial services, retail, and other service
industries. 45 Yet, manufacturing companies-especially firms in large-scale
industries like automobiles and steel-are much more likely to offer retiree
41. I.R.C. § 106 (2008).
42. See Holman W. Jenkins, The Biggest Secret in Health Care, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at
A14 (noting that analysts across the political spectrum believe that changing the tax exclusion for
health insurance premiums is an essential element of health care reform).
43. See, e.g., 2008 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS: SIDE-BY-SIDE
SUMMARY, available at http://www.health08.org/sidebyside.cfm; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX
BENEFITS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE AND EXPENSES: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION
(2007), available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33505_20070720.pdf; PAUL FRONSTIN & DALLAS
SALISBURY, HEALTH INSURANCE AND TAXES: CAN CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF HEALTH
INSURANCE FIX OUR HEALTH CARE SYSTEM? (Employee Benefit Research Inst., Issue Brief No.
309, 2007), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_ IB_09-20071.pdf; Joseph R.
Antos, Is There a Right Way To Promote Health Insurance Through the Tax System?, 59 NAT'L
TAX J. 477 (2006); Len Burman et al., An Evaluation of the President's Health Insurance Proposal,
114 TAX NOTES 1013 (2007); Jason Furman, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right, 59 NAT'L TAX J.
491 (2006).
44. See Susan E. Cancelosi, Revisiting Employer Prescription Drug Plans for Medicare-
Eligible Retirees in the Medicare Part D Era, 6 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 85, 104 (2005)
("[P]rotecting employee health as a means to enhance productivity and reduce absenteeism
obviously does not extend to retirees who, by definition, no longer contribute actively to the
workplace.").
45. Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV.
607, 683 (2000).
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health benefits in any form than new economic powerhouses like Wal-Mart and
Google. 46 Those old-line industries, moreover, have reduced their U.S.
workforces to such an extent that their number of current employees is often
dwarfed by their number of retirees.47 These reduced payrolls, in turn, make it
even more attractive from an employer's standpoint to slash health care coverage
for retirees. In other words, not only are health care costs higher and rising faster
on a per-person basis for retirees than for current employees, 4 8 there are also
more retirees-in some cases, many more retirees-than current employees.49
These pressures provided the backdrop for General Motors' dramatic decision in
mid-2008 to eliminate retiree health benefits for its non-unionized Medicare-
eligible retirees.50 Only one year earlier, the company had shifted all
responsibility for health care costs of its unionized retirees to a new union-
controlled entity in exchange for a one-time transfer of funds. 5' The point is that
the rising cost of health care has combined with larger trends affecting the
composition of the American workplace to seriously imperil the provision of
retiree health benefits.
B. Accounting Disclosure Requirements
Compounding these cost-reduction tendencies in the face of rising health
care costs, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) began requiring
nongovernmental employers to disclose the projected cost of future retiree health
benefits. FASB's fateful Statement No. 106, entitled "Employers' Accounting for
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions," first effective in 1992,52
46. See CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 134 (noting disparity in retiree health benefit
availability by industry); FINKEL & RUCHLIN, supra note 14, at 65-66 (same).
47. See Anna M. Rappaport & Carol H. Malone, Adequacy of Employer-Sponsored Retiree
Health Benefit Programs, in PROVIDING HEALTH CARE, supra note 29, at 59-61 (noting that the
ratio of retirees to current workers is three to one); Jeffrey Zaslow & Gregory L. White. For G1
Retirees, It Feels Less Like 'Generous Motors,' WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2003, at Al ("GM's 460,000
retirees and surviving spouses now outnumber active employees in the U.S. nearly 3 to 1.").
48. See HEWITT ASSOCIATES, TIAA-CREF INST., THE RETIREE HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE 2
(2006), available at http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/pdf/research/dvds-books/1 10106.pdf.
49. See id. at 3 (retiree health care costs represent 29% of total health care costs among large
employers offering such benefits).
50. See Bill Vlasic, With Warning, G.M. Takes Wide Cost Cuts, N.Y. TiME1S, July 16, 2008, at
CI (noting that this elimination of benefits 'was unexpected").
51. See Jeffrey McCracken & John D. Stoll, UA W, GM Near Historic Deal on Retiree Health
Costs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2007, at A3; Jyoti Thottam, GM's Get- Well Plan, TIME, Oct. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1663838-1,00.html; see also John
D. Stoll, UA W Weighs Health-Care Trust, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2007, at A8.
52. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT
BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS: STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 106
(1990), available at http ://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas 1 06.pdf.
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represented a sharp break with prior practices because most companies do not
pre-fund retiree health benefits. 53 In contrast to the typical practice of making
annual cash outlays to pay future pension obligations, companies generally pay
retiree health care costs as the retirees receive this care, with few financial assets
set aside in advance.54 FASB Statement No. 106 required employers to
acknowledge the substantial drain on future profits that they had undertaken with
respect to both current and prospective retirees. As one analyst explained,
The rationale was that retiree medical benefits are a form of deferred
compensation for current employees, and the future benefits should be reported
as they are earned. The underlying theory was that if an employer is going to
hold out these benefits to employees in trade for their work, the obligation of
paying for them down the line has to be recognized at the time the work
earning the benefit is done and the obligation incurred.55
From a financial accounting perspective, in other words, incurred costs-
including future health care expenses of current employees-should be reflected
in an employer's financial results when that employer assumes responsibility for
those costs. Notwithstanding the theoretical correctness of this approach, the
result was a major increase in the annual cost reported by employers for their
operations, in some cases, as much as five to ten times the cost on a pay-as-you-
go basis.
5 6
Faced with these financial statement disclosures, many companies felt
considerable pressure to reduce the extent of their obligations, and many firms
initiated cost-reduction strategies to that end.5 7 The impact was calamitous for
retirees. Among employers with at least 200 employees, the share of such
employers who offer any type of retiree benefits dropped from 66% in 1988 to
35% in 2006.58 Even larger employers-namely, those with at least 1000
53. See KAISER/HEWITT SURVEY, supra note 7, at 12 (75% of retiree health benefit plans are
not pre-funded). Even among employers with 20,000 or more employees, 60% of such plans are not
pre-funded. Id.
54. See FINKEL & RUCHLIN, supra note 14, at 66.
55. Sylvester S. Schieber, The Outlook of Retiree Health Benefits, TIAA-CREF RES.
DIALOGUE, Sept. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/pdf/research/
research-dialogue/8 1.pdf
56. Deborah J. Chollet, Is Retiree Health Insurance Crowding Out Retiree Cash Benefits?, in
PROVIDING HEALTH CARE, supra note 29, at 17, 20. See generally Rappaport & Malone, supra note
47, at 72-74 (cost impact of the FASB pronouncement).
57. See FRONSTIN, supra note 22, at 8; TIAA-CREF INST., supra note 48, at 3-4; CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR RETIREES 12 (2006), available at
http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL32944_20060328.pdf, see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 21, at 10.
58. KAISER/HEWITT SURVEY, supra note 7, at 1. Among all private sector employers, the
proportion offering retiree health benefits has declined from 20-22% in 1997 to 13% in 2002. See
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employees-have diminished their offerings of retiree health benefits steadily, as
this chart shows:
59
Percentage of All Large Firms (1,000 or More Workers) Offering Retiree Health Benefits, 1991-2006
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involving approximately twenty-six and thirty-one million retirees in 1997 and
2002, respectively, 61 found that female retirees were three times as likely as male
FRONSTIN, supra note 22, at 4.
59. Reprinted with permission from HEWITT ASSOCIATES supra note 48, at 6.
60. Of these employers 85% offer health benefits to both pre-Medicare and Medicare-eligible
retrees, while 14% offer benefits only to pre-Medicare retirees. KAISERiHEWITT SURVFY. supra
note 7, at 4.
6 1. d. at 15 see, e.g., Amy Merrick, Sears Is To Make Additional Cuts to Retirees' Medical
Benefits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2005 at A2.
62. See FRONSTIN, supra note 22, at 12-13.
63. Id. at 12.
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retirees to lose retiree health benefits during the period examined.64 Non-
unionized retired workers were also three times as likely as unionized retired
workers to see such a decline.65 Thus, the general decline of unionization in the
American workplace further undermines the provision of retiree health benefits.66
As bad as this situation is, newly effective accounting pronouncements are
likely to exacerbate it. In 2006, the FASB promulgated Statement No. 158, which
requires that the net obligation for retiree health benefits be shown on the face of
the financial statements themselves, rather than being buried in the voluminous
notes that typically accompany financial statements. 67 This change was deemed
necessary by the FASB, because "presenting such information only in the notes
made it more difficult for users of financial statements to assess an employer's
financial position and ability to satisfy postretirement benefit obligations.",6 8 As a
result, public and privately-held companies, as well as nongovernmental not-for-
profit organizations, are now required to highlight the expected cost of retiree
health benefits beginning with fiscal years that end after June 15, 2007, and in
some cases even earlier.69 Such heightened disclosure is likely to increase
existing pressures on employers to lower the cost of these benefits by reducing
their scope of coverage.
A similar pattern may develop in the governmental sector where retiree
health benefits are even more common. Fully forty-eight of the fifty states and
more than half of all municipalities currently provide such benefits. 70 Nearly all
governmental employers pay the cost of these benefits out of current budgetary
receipts with no provision for future expenditures. 71 But this pay-as-you-go
approach is being challenged by Statement No. 45 of the Governmental
Accounting Standards Board (GASB), entitled "Accounting and Financial
64. Id.
65. Id. at 14-15.
66. See Buchmueller, Dinardo & Valletta, supra note 27, at 626.
67. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT
PENSION AND OTHER POSTRETIREMENT PLANS: STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
No. 158 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/ fasl58.pdf; see HEWITT ASSOCIATES, supra
note 48, at 4.
68. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra note 67, at Summary (unnumbered second page).
69. Id. paras. 12-14, at 7.
70. Janice Revell, The Great State Health-Care Giveaway, FORTUNE, May 2, 2005, at 43, 44;
see also Judith F. Mazo, Introduction to Retiree Health Benefits, in PROVIDING HEALTH CARE,
supra note 29, at 9, 11 (noting the "traditional pattern of public employers offering richer benefits
than much of the private sector in return for lower cash compensation"); The Other Benefits Mess,
KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Sept. 2007, at 17 (82% of public-sector employers provide retiree
health benefits).
71. See, e.g., David Denholm, States Nearing Crisis in Retiree Benefits, HEALTH CARE NEwS,
July 2007, at 15; Chris Edwards & Jagadeesh Gokhale, A $2 Trillion Fiscal Hole, WALL ST. J., Oct.
12. 2006, at A 18.
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Reporting by Employers for Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions., 72
This Statement deals with "other post-employment benefits," which principally
includes health care benefits, but can also encompass dental care, vision care, and
life insurance] 3
GASB Statement No. 45 requires state and local governments to estimate the
projected cost of their other post-employment benefits 74 and to record as a
current-year expense the amount that would be needed to fund this projected cost
over the next thirty years.75 Although the affected governments need not actually
transfer cash equal to this expense, they must disclose the amount of this
obligation.76 Substantially similar to FASB Statement No. 106, GASB Statement
No. 45 applies to all governmental entities for fiscal years after December 15,
2008. 7 7 While its implementation is only now upon us, and it is impossible to
predict what changes these disclosures will precipitate, a re-examination of
retiree health care benefits is likely. Some analysts have already described the
employers covered by GASB Statement No. 45 as "shocked, simply shocked" by
the required revelations,78 and the taxpayers who must fund these retiree health
care benefits may be similarly surprised by the extent of the future tax
obligations that they have unwittingly assumed. To citizens who themselves have
lost-or perhaps never even had-employer-provided retiree health care benefits,
efforts to reduce these promised benefits may look extremely appealing. "9 As
was the case with private sector employers, state and local government
employers may find that the new GASB accounting rules provide an impetus--or
"cover" perhaps-to reduce retiree health care benefits that were already under
pressure from rising health inflation trends, increasing retiree-to-employee ratios,
and tax revenue shortfalls.8"
72. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING
BY EMPLOYERS FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS: STATE\MFNT No. 45 OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (2004) [hereinafter GASB No. 45].
73. Id. para. 7, at 3.
74. Id. paras. 19-20, at 13-14.
75. Id. para. 13(f)(1), at 9-10.
76. See Ronald Kramer & Mark Casciari, Government [sic] Accounting Standards Board
(GASB) Statement No. 45 Makes Public Employers Revisit Retiree Health Insurance, 37 URB. LAW.
427,430 (2005).
77. GASB No. 45, supra note 72, para. 36, at 35.
78. See Revell, supra note 70, at 44.
79. See generally Stan Wisniewski & Lorel Wismewski, State Government Retiree Health
Benefits: Current Status and Potential Impact of New Accounting Standards, AARP PUB. POL'Y
INST. 19-25 (2004), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenterhealth/2004 08_benefits.pdf
Regarding possible state constitutional constraints on reducing governmental retirees' health
benefits, see Kramer & Casciari, supra note 76, at 443-46.
80. See Schieber, supra note 55, at 9; see also Robert L. Clark, Financing Retiree Health
Care: Assessing GASB 45 Estimates of Liabilities, CENTER FOR STATE & LOCAL GO\ ERNMENT
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II. LEGAL RECOURSE WHEN BENEFITS ARE REDUCED OR TERMINATED
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, better known as
ERISA, provides statutory protections for employee benefits generally, including
retiree health benefits. 8' This federal law regulates employer-provided pension
plans and welfare plans to protect employees' future interests, while encouraging
employer development of retiree benefit plans. 2 Pension plans are essentially
future installment income plans paid to employees, 83 while welfare plans are
maintained to provide employees with "medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits .... ,,4 Although ERISA does not require employers to provide
employee benefit plans, an employer that chooses to do so becomes subject to its
requirements.8 5
ERISA medical plans are subject principally to 1) reporting and disclosure
requirements, 2) fiduciary rules, and 3) enforcement and remedial measures. 86
With respect to reporting and disclosure requirements, ERISA requires the plan
administrator to file a fully comprehensive description of the plan with the U.S.
Secretary of Labor and to furnish plan participants and beneficiaries with a
summary plan description that is "written in a manner ... to be understood by the
average plan participant, and ... sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to
reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights ... under the
plan."87
Regarding fiduciary responsibilities, ERISA requires that every employee
EXCELLENCE ISSUE BRIEF 4 (2008), available at http://www.slge.org/ (follow the "Financing
Retiree Health Care: Assessing GASB 45 Estimates of Liabilities" hyperlink at left) ("[M]ost plans
covering state and local government employees and retirees are amended regularly in an effort to
reduce cost increases.").
81. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 100lb(c) (2000). Congressional adoption of ERISA was meant to balance
competing goals of employee benefit protection and reasonable standards for employers. See also
Melissa Elaine Stover, Maintaining ERISA's Balance: The Fundamental Business Decision v. The
Affirmative Fiduciary Duty To Disclose Proposed Changes, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 689, 690 &
nn.l-2 (2001).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2000) (Pension plans "provide retirement income to employees,
or result . . in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination
of... employment or beyond.").
84. Id. § 1002(1). In this Article, the phrases -'welfare plan," "medical plan," and "health care
plan" are used interchangeably to refer to post-retirement health care arrangements.
85. For a comprehensive overview of ERISA, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE &
BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW (4th ed. 2006).
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114, 1131-1147 (2000) (applying to welfare benefit
plans).
87. Id. §§ 1021(f)(4), 1022(a), 1024(b).
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benefit plan "be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument" and
that every plan "provide a procedure for amending such plan ,88 To protect
the interests of employees and beneficiaries, ERISA imposes the common law
duties of a trustee on the fiduciaries of the employee benefit plan. 89 A legal
person is a fiduciary with respect to a benefits plan if that person exercises
control over plan management, renders investment advice, or maintains
discretionary authority over the plan's execution. 90  Corporate benefit
administrators, therefore, undertake fiduciary obligations to plan participants by
disseminating and managing benefit plans within the employer company.
However, these duties attach only when the employer actually functions as a
fiduciary rather than as a self-interested business entity. 91 The Supreme Court
formulated the so-called "two hats" 92 doctrine to create a threshold when an
employer's fiduciary duties attach, stating that an employer is subject to fiduciary
liability under ERISA only when performing one of the statutorily defined
functions. 93 Ultimately, an employer's actions determine its fiduciary status, not
simply its position.
With respect to enforcement and remedial measures, ERISA provides that
participants and beneficiaries have a cause of action for violations of the
reporting and disclosure requirements or the fiduciary responsibilities created by
this statute. 94 A participant or beneficiary also has a cause of action to protect
contractually defined benefits. 95 Moreover, a participant or beneficiary has a
cause of action against any person who discharges "or discriminate[s] against a
participant or beneficiary for exercising any right ... under the employee benefit
plan ... for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which
such participant may become entitled under the plan.",
96
In the interest of national uniformity, Congress federalized the law of
employee benefit plans, except for a few areas such as state regulation of
insurers. 97 Rights and remedies under ERISA are largely limited to reporting,
disclosures, and fiduciary responsibilities. In effect, ERISA pre-empted the more
88. Id. §§ 1102(a)(1), (b)(3).
89. Id. § 1104.
90. See id. § 1002(21)(A).
91. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
92. See Stover, supra note 82, at 715-17 (2001). The concept is entitled "two hats" because the
company's actor can wear either a "fiduciary" hat when acting as benefits plan administrator or
"business entity" hat when acting in the interests of the business.
93. Id. at 698, 717-19 (noting that employer is only subject to ERISA fiduciary duties when
wearing its "fiduciary hat" as functionally defined).
94.29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(l)(A), (3), (4) (2000).
95. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
96. Id. § 1140.
97. Id. § 1 144(b)(2)(A).
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comprehensive rights and remedies that might have been available under state
law. Courts have, on occasion, supplemented ERISA with federal common law. 98
This Part begins by examining the employer's right under ERISA to change
health benefit plans. It then discusses the extent to which this right is limited
because an employee's rights have vested and cannot be unilaterally altered by
the employer-both in a unionized context and in a non-unionized setting. This
Part next considers claims that employers have breached fiduciary duties in
changing retiree health benefits. Finally, this Part analyzes claims of estoppel-
namely, that the employer's prior actions bar subsequent changes that might
otherwise be allowed.
A. Employer's Right To Change Health Benefit Plans
ERISA clearly allows employers to change health benefit plans, as the
Supreme Court held in Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen.99 As long as an
employer retains the right to do so, that employer is "generally free under
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate [its] welfare
plan."100 Moreover, ERISA does not specify any vesting guarantees for welfare
plans, unlike its stipulated mandatory vesting requirements for pension plans.101
In the benefits context, vesting means that an employee has attained an
unalterable right to a particular provision. Thus, while pension benefits cannot be
changed if they have vested according to ERISA's guidelines, health care
benefits have no such statutory protection.
ERISA's silence regarding the vesting of health care benefits has spawned
extensive litigation and nuanced jurisprudential hopscotch over whether vesting
of welfare benefits can occur in the absence of explicit and unambiguous
contractual language in a company's benefits plan agreement. These cases have
arisen both in the organized labor context, where benefit plans are formulated
through negotiated collective bargaining agreements, and in individual employee
benefit plans that are unilaterally written and instituted by the employer. As will
be seen shortly, in neither context are retirees automatically vested in welfare
benefit plans; rather, they must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
their former employer intended for the retiree health benefits to be vested. 102 But
extrinsic evidence about the intent of the parties is considered only when the
retirement plan language is ambiguous due to conflicting clauses or multiple
98. See, e.g., PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543 (9th
Cir. 1992).
99. 514 U.S. 73 (1995).
100. Id. at 78.
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061, 1081-1086 (2000).
102. Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 1990): see also McMunn v. Pirelli
Tire LLC, 161 F. Supp. 2d 97, 122 (D. Conn. 2001).
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plausible interpretations or is otherwise silent as to an employer's intent that the
benefits vest.l°3 In the absence of such situations, the plan documents stand on
their own.
Although vesting claims are contractual disputes that focus on an employer's
failure to honor allegedly vested health care benefits, an employer's fiduciary
conduct in benefits communications can also come under legal scrutiny.
Employer representatives potentially breach their ERISA-mandated fiduciary
duty by making false statements to employees, and these statements can lead to
employee claims for misrepresentation and estoppel. Employers may breach their
fiduciary duties when their representatives make material misrepresentations
either intentionally or negligently, depending on the judicial circuit. Estoppel
claims may arise from employers' making false representations that their retirees
detrimentally relied upon in making their retirement choices.
For example, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Vallone v. CNA Financial
Corp. 104 provides an apt starting point for considering retirees' legal claims in
lost benefits cases, because it included retiree claims on all three legal theories:
contract breach regarding vesting, breach of fiduciary duty, and estoppel.
Michael Vallone and two fellow employees at Continental Insurance Company
accepted an early retirement package in 1991 that included a provision of
"lifetime" welfare benefits known as the Health Care Allowance (HCA). 05 This
provision of lifetime HCA benefits was reiterated both orally and in writing to
the early retirees. 10 6 Eight years later, CNA Financial Corporation, the plan's
employer-administrator that had acquired Continental Insurance, notified Mr.
Vallone and the other early-retirees that their HCAs were being terminated.
10 7
CNA's basis for retiree benefits termination was a contractual clause that
reserved the employer's right to change or amend the plan.1 08
In a class action, Vallone brought suit against CNA on three substantive
issues: 1) breach of contract under ERISA for not honoring the alleged lifetime
nature of HCA benefits (i.e., a vesting argument), 2) breach of its ERISA
103. Helen M. Kemp, The Employer Giveth and Taketh Away: Retiree Health Benefits Under
ERISA-Governed Health Plans, THE BRIEF (Am. Bar Ass'n, Chi., Ill.), Spring 2005, at 16, 18
(discussing employer-employee disputes over benefit vesting).
104. 375 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2004).
105. Id. at 626.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 634 (holding that reservation of rights allows stripping of "'lifetime" benefits
because contractual silence as to vesting presumes non-vested benefit status; also noting that "in the
perhaps beady eyes of the law, the 'lifetime' nature of a welfare benefit does not operate to vest
that benefit if the employer reserved the right to amend or terminate the benefit, given 'what it
takes to overcome the presumption that welfare benefits do not vest') (quoting Diehl v. Twin Disc,
102 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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fiduciary duty by providing informational misrepresentations as plan
administrator, and 3) promissory estoppel for the retirees' reasonable reliance on
the employer's misrepresentations. 0 9 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's summary judgment for CNA on all claims. 110 First, the court found that
the employer's reservation clause was sufficiently unambiguous as to CNA's
intentions to not vest welfare benefits in its standard retirement plans, and the
early retirement package constituted simply a modification to the existing plan
rather than an entirely new plan."' Second, the court held that the employer did
not breach its fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, because CNA's representatives did
not intentionally deceive the early retirees when they made material
misrepresentations about their benefits. Lastly, the retirees could not show a
knowing misrepresentation of fact on CNA's behalf to prevail on an estoppel
claim; plaintiffs, moreover, did not substantiate their reasonable reliance on
CNA's purported misrepresentations. 1 3 The Vallone plaintiffs thus failed to
prevail on any of their three legal theories. This case illustrates well that retirees
are not likely to prevail on legal challenges to employers who modify the terms
of post-retirement welfare plans.
B. Vesting Claims
As a general matter, health benefits plans are reduced to the written terms of
the ERISA-governed benefit plan document. While ERISA allows employers a
right to amend benefit plans, employers may relinquish this right by affirmatively
contracting with their employees for vesting of the employees' welfare benefits,
including health care coverage in retirement. 4 To this end, retirees who want to
protect their benefits must invariably argue that the benefit plan language
included an employer commitment to vest and that such vesting was impervious
to future employer modification; stated differently, retirees must prove that the
employer promised to vest benefits and that the duration of that promise was
unlimited within a retiree's lifetime. It is the employees' burden to prove these
facts in order to overcome the Curtiss-Wright rule that employers are free to
modify benefit plans where they have reserved the right to do so. As will be seen
below, employee-retirees have significant difficulty prevailing on such claims,
whether in a unionized or non-unionized setting.
109. Id. at 626-27.
110. Id. at 626.
111. Id. at 634-35.
112. Id. at 640-642 (endorsing the intentional deception standard necessary for breach of
fiduciary duty and stating that a "breach of fiduciary duty exists if fiduciaries 'mislead plan
participants or misrepresent the terms or administration of a plan"') (quoting Anweiler v. American
Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993)).
113. Id. at 639-40.
114. See Kemp, supra note 103, at 18.
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1. The Unionized Workplace
In a union context, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) governs
benefit plans and provides the basis for deciding the parties' intent and scope of
vested benefits. The written document describing the terms of the collectively
bargained benefits is called a Summary Plan Description, or SPD, which is the
statutorily mandated vehicle by which employees are informed of their
coverage. 115 SPDs usually contain clauses reserving an employer's right to
amend benefit plans at a later time, but other language in the document often
suggests that the benefits are unequivocally vested for the employees' lifetimes.
These conflicting provisions therefore give rise to litigation when employers later
amend plans, and retirees object by claiming that their benefits are vested for life.
In such cases of contractual ambiguity, the rules of contract interpretation require
the court to assess the intent of the parties.
a. Inter-Circuit Disagreement over Inferring an Employer's Intent to
Vest Benefits
The most controversial and widely cited federal case regarding contractual
ambiguity and intent of the parties regarding benefits in a union setting is UA W v.
Yard-Man, Inc.1 6 This case is well-known for the Sixth Circuit's groundbreaking
"Yard-Man inference" that silence as to benefits' duration suggests an
employer's intent to vest. 117 Although the United Automobile Workers (UAW)
and the company agreed to provide retiree welfare benefits in a 1974 CBA, the
company terminated these benefits after the CBA's three-year term expired.''
Viewing the retiree benefit provision language stating that the company "will
provide insurance benefits equal to the active group" as reasonably ambiguous
regarding the benefits' duration, the Sixth Circuit allowed extrinsic evidence to
be considered under the rules of contract interpretation. 119
The court, inferring into the situational context the relative bargaining
positions of the parties, ruled that retiree health benefits extended beyond the
115. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a), 1102 (2000).
116. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th cir. 1983).
117. See Jason Blumberg, Comment, Bringing Back the Yard-Man Inference, 4 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMi'. L. 195, 201 (2001).
118. 716 F.2d at 1478.
119. ld. at 1480 (internal quotation marks omitted). LA\ interpreted the phrase as a
characterization of the nature of the benefits (i.e., wxhat benefits they were promised), while the
company read it as tying retirccs bcncfits to those of active employees who were to be terminated
at the end of the (BA due to plant closing and the cessation of an active work force. See Douglas
Sondgeroth, Note, High Hopes. Wyn Courts Should Fulfill Expectations of Lifetime Retiree Health
Benefits in Ambiguous Collective Bargaining Agreements, 42 B.C. L. R-\'. 1215, 1231-32 (2001)
(explaining and defending the Yard-Man inference).
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expiration of the CBA. It reasoned that retiree benefits were akin to status
benefits that "carry with them an inference that they continue so long as the
prerequisite status is maintained. Thus, when the parties contract for benefits
which accrue upon achievement of retiree status, there is an inference that the
parties likely intended those benefits to continue as long as the beneficiary
remains a retiree." 120 Retirees had a justified expectation of future welfare
benefits, the court found, because retirement benefits are "typically understood as
a form of delayed compensation or reward for past services" that would not
likely "be left to the contingencies of future negotiations." 121 In other words, the
retiree health benefits had already accrued to retirees in exchange for previously
sacrificed wages and were not subject to later agreements."' Having inferred
these points and considered all factors, the Sixth Circuit decided that the specific
benefits clause vested retiree benefits interminably and ultimately trumped the
routine three-year duration clause pronounced for the CBA as a whole. Because
the agreement contained specific duration clauses for other less significant
benefits, the generalized duration clause could not defeat the specialized benefits
language into which the court read an intent to vest.
Two trends have been evident in the jurisprudential wake of Yard-Man.
First, and far more conventional than controversial, the Sixth Circuit's
application of the interpretive canon that the "specific controls the general" found
accord among other circuits that later adopted Yard-Man's distinction between
specific and general duration clauses. In United Steelworkers of America v.
Connors Steel Co., 12 3 for example, the Eleventh Circuit confronted the issue of
whether retiree health benefits terminated at the expiration of the CBA. The
agreement provided that retirees "shall not have such coverage terminated or
reduced ... so long as the individual remains retired from the company ...
notwithstanding the expiration of this agreement." 1 24 As in Yard-Man, the court
held that a specific duration clause overrides a general duration clause. Because
contract interpretation is highly factual, courts have sometimes found that the
language of the agreement unambiguously provided retirees lifetime benefits that
did not end with the expiration of the CBA. 125
Second, the Yard-Man inference spawned chaos among the circuit courts as
to its validity, force, and effect, although some commentators have pointed to
limiting language in the opinion to say that the Sixth Circuit's approach was not
120. 716 F.2d at 1482 (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Sondgeroth, supra note 119, at 1232 (explaining the Sixth Circuit's rationale for the
Yard-Man inference).
123. 855 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988).
124. Id. at 1505.
125. See, e.g., Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1996); Policy v. Power Pressed
Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985).
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nearly as radical as it has been interpreted by other courts. 12 6 The Sixth Circuit
itself incorrectly applied its own precedent in Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel
Co. 127 by decreeing that "normally retiree benefits are vested," which
substantially overstates the thrust of Yard-Man. 12 8 But it subsequently corrected
its mistake in In re White Farm Equipment Co., 29 by overruling a federal district
court that had found under the federal common law of ERISA that welfare
benefits vest automatically on retirement and are nonterminable, despite plain
language in the plan authorizing such termination 30 : "[W]e find that ... ERISA,
though silent on this issue, counsels against ... an absolute rule effectively
requiring mandatory vesting at retirement of retiree welfare benefits . . . . [W]e
discern no basis for finding mandatory vesting in ERISA of retiree welfare
benefits."
'131
Other circuits generally agree with In re White Farm Equipment Co. that
retiree benefits do not automatically vest absent affirmative language to that
effect. The Third Circuit has found that "[retiree] welfare benefits do not
automatically vest as a matter of law,"' 132 while the Eighth Circuit has said that
"Congress explicitly exempted welfare benefits from ERISA's vesting
requirements. It, therefore, seems illogical to infer an intent to vest welfare
benefits in every situation where an employee is eligible to receive them on the
day he retires." 133 Similarly, the Second Circuit persuasively argued that:
[Congress rejected] [a]utomatic vesting . because the costs of such plans are
subject to fluctuating and unpredictable variables. Actuarial decisions
concerning [pensions] are based on fairly stable data, and vesting is
appropriate. In contrast, medical insurance must take account of inflation,
changes in medical practice and technology, and increases in the costs of
treatment independent of inflation. These unstable variables prevent accurate
predictions of future needs and costs. 1
34
Still, significant disagreement among circuits has developed since Yard-Man
regarding the degree of importance that should be attached to the inference of
vesting when a contract is ambiguous. Some circuits deem the inference a strong
126. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 117, at 202 (arguing that the Yard-Man inference is only
one of many factors to consider, and although the Sixth Circuit made this abundantly clear, some
future courts have applied the inference too broadly).
127. 770 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1985).
128. Id. at 613-14.
129. 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986).
130. Id. at 1190.
131. Id. at 1192-93.
132. Molnar v. Wibbelt, 789 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1986).
133. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th Cir. 1988).
134. Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988).
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factor in ascertaining the intent of the parties to a CBA, 135 while others consider
it only selectively. For instance, the Fifth Circuit limits application of the vesting
inference to those instances in which retirees have no voice in negotiating a new
CBA. 136 By contrast, a vesting inference has no place in the Seventh Circuit,
which has ruled that there is a presumption against vesting beyond the duration
of a CBA if the agreement is silent on the issue, unless retirees can show by
objective evidence that the agreement is latently ambiguous. 137 This ruling is
compelling for two reasons. First, the union negotiates the terms of the
agreement, so it is highly unlikely that the union was naive about the risks of
having ambiguity or silence on an issue. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the ruling treats CBAs and unbargained-for ERISA plans consistently in this
regard.
b. Recent Union Cases Show Employers' Diligence in Avoiding
Contractual Ambiguity and Precluding the Possibility of
an Intent-to- Vest Inference
Despite the significant disagreement among circuit courts regarding an
employer's intent to vest benefits, this issue is becoming less significant as courts
generally find benefit plans straightforward enough, or sufficiently unambiguous,
to preclude the consideration of extrinsic evidence. Furthermore, the decline in
union density, changed economic circumstances, and shifting composition of the
workforce have weakened the bargaining power of unions to safeguard the
benefits interests of their members. 138 The chronological sampling below of
recent Courts of Appeals cases demonstrates that retirees have routinely been
unsuccessful on claims of vested benefits and contract breach against their
employers.
i) Hughes v. 3M Retiree Medical Plan (2002)139
A married couple sued their former employer and its retiree medical plan in
response to the employer's changes to their medical benefits after they had
retired. The employer implemented a revised retiree plan that included
135. See Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 654 (6th Cir. 1996); Keffer v. H.K. Porter
Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989); United Steelworkers v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.
1987).
136. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1997);
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Champion Int'l Corp., 908 F.2d 1252, 1261 n.12 (5th Cir.
1990); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d 228, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1997).
137. Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc., 217 F.3d 539, 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2000).
138. See Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Changing World of Employee Benefits, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 625, 627-28 (2004).
139. 281 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2002).
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"additional cost sharing by retirees"; however, plaintiffs contended that the
"Your Benefits" booklet given to them by the company following the 1991
union-employer CBA contained vesting language stating that "[i]f you retire with
15 years of pension service regardless of when you were hired, you and your
spouse will receive medical benefits for your lifetime at company expense." 140
The Eighth Circuit found that the benefits booklet cited by plaintiffs was not
the correct SPD, as the booklet referred participants over age sixty-five to a
separate "Med-Supp Plan" brochure that governed plaintiffs' plan and contained
no language even remotely suggestive of vesting. Regardless of which booklet
was appropriate, both documents-"Med-Supp Plan" or "Your Benefits"-
contained reservation clauses stating that while the company intended to continue
the plan indefinitely, it reserved the right to amend or discontinue benefits.
142
These reservation-of-rights clauses sufficed for 3M to unilaterally alter retiree
benefits long after the CBA was ratified. Interestingly, whereas the "Your
Benefits" booklet for workers under age sixty-five read that the company
"reserves the right to amend or discontinue.., subject to collective bargaining as
required," 143 the Med-Supp Plan's reservation clause concluded with "reserves
the right to change or discontinue it if necessary."' 4 4 Although not mentioned in
the opinion, it seems that retirees are more at risk than are current employees,
since the employer could alter their plan "if necessary" rather than "subject to
collective bargaining as required," the standard applicable to current employees.
ii) UA W v. Rockford Powertrain, Inc. (2003) 145
Former union member retirees, surviving spouses of retirees, and their local
union sued their former employer, Rockford Powertrain, Inc. (RPI). after RPI cut
welfare benefits midway through the term of the instant CBA.146 RPI had
acquired the manufacturing plant of the retirees' previous employer in 1988,
assumed the existing CBA, and thereafter re-negotiated subsequent CBAs
periodically with the UAW. 147 Although the latest CBA was to apply through
2001, RPI announced benefit cuts in late 1999 that would 1) reduce medical
insurance coverage by increasing retirees' share of premiums and 2) fully
terminate life insurance benefits across its active and retired workforce. 14s Citing
recessionary economic pressures, RPI terminated all health benefits for active
140. Id. at 789.
141. Id. at 792.
142. Id. at 792-93.
143. Id. at 789.
144. Id. at 792.
145. 350 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003).
146. Id. at 700.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 701-02.
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employees and retirees the following year. 149
Although all SPDs published by RPI included a reservation-of-rights clause
in the "Future of Plans" section of the plan description, 150 plaintiffs alleged that
their health benefits had fully vested based on language found in other sections of
the document covering post-retirement health and life-insurance benefits. A
clause in the retiree health benefits section, which the court dubbed the "lifetime
benefits provision," read that "health coverage is continued ... until
death ... [and if] you die after retirement, health coverage may be continued for
your spouse."1 51  However, this language contradicted what the court
characterized as a "plan termination clause" found elsewhere in the same section
saying that "in the event this group plan is terminated, coverage for you and your
dependents will end immediately."1 52 The potential ambiguity of the plan,
plaintiffs argued, was further buttressed by silence on both of these matters-
vesting and termination-in the post-retirement life insurance benefits section. 153
The Seventh Circuit, citing its own precedent and that of the Supreme Court,
explained that welfare benefits do not vest automatically, but rather are subject to
employer modification, amendment, or termination under ERISA when the
employer has not contractually "cede[d] its freedom" to do so.' 54 Accordingly,
the court would adhere to "federal principles of contract construction, meaning
that [it would] give contract terms their 'ordinary and popular' sense and avoid
resort to extrinsic evidence when faced with unambiguous language. ' 155 In
applying such principles and keying on the canon of interpreting potentially
conflicting language to be in agreement with a document's integrated whole the
court determined that the contractual language of the reservation-of-rights,
"lifetime benefits," and "plan termination" clauses did not create ambiguity as to
RPI's intent to vest benefits.1 56 While RPI intended to provide lifetime welfare
coverage for its retirees when it wrote the plans, such coverage was subject to the
employer's will. 157 Thus, although the SPD purportedly conferred lifetime
benefits on its employees, the employer's right to modify and its explicit
149. Id. at 702.
150. RPI's reservation of rights clause in all SPDs read, "[a]lthough the company expects and
intends to continue the plan indefinitely, it reserves the right to modify, amend, suspend or
terminate them at any time." Id. at 701.
151. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing potentially contradictory contractual
provisions).
152. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 702 (citing Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 520 U.S. 510, 515 (1997); Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1996)).
155. Id. at 702-03 (quoting Diehl, 102 F.3d at 306).
156. Id. at 703.
157. Id. (citing Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir.
2001): In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit " ERISA" Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 904 (3d Cir. 1995)).
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affirmation of such ability in the reservation-of-rights clause could not be read as
promising vested healthcare benefits. Moreover, because the current union-RPI
CBA did not specifically discuss terms of post-retirement welfare benefits, but
instead incorporated the terms of an overall insurance agreement for all benefits-
related issues that included a reservation-of-rights clause, RPI was contractually
empowered to terminate benefits in the middle of the CBA's term rather than
waiting until its expiration. 158
iii) McCoy v. Meridian Automotive Systems, Inc. (2004)159
The Sixth Circuit, perhaps in homage to the liberality it expounded in Yard-
Man, has recently been more lenient toward the plight of retirees losing their
health benefits. In this case, the Sixth Circuit upheld a lower court's injunction
against an employer's attempt to slash retirees' health coverage based on the
theory that the retirees' welfare benefits were directly tied to vested pension
benefits granted in the CBA.1 60 In so deciding, the court cited Yard-Man
principles to set the analytical stage-namely, that 1) parties to a CBA may
contract for benefits that continue beyond the life of the agreement, 2) the rules
of contract interpretation apply to view provisions as part of an integrated whole,
and 3) extrinsic evidence is to be considered only when ambiguity remains from
such a reading. 1
61
In following these rules and applying post-Yard-Man cases, the court
resolved two overarching issues in the retirees' favor. First, it determined that the
language in the "Supplemental Agreement" between the employer and UAW was
sufficiently clear in tying together eligibilities for health benefits and pensions. 
162
Second, and more importantly, the Sixth Circuit allowed the Supplemental
Agreement to be considered in the proceeding because of its incorporation into
158. Id. at 705 ("RPI's unilateral reduction, and later termination, of post-retirement benefits
was not an impermissible mid-term unilateral change because the text of the plan-and by
incorporation, the text of the CBA-reserved RPI's right to alter the specific terms of insurance.").
159. 390 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2004).
160. Id. at 420-22.
161. Id. at 421-22.
162. Id. at 422. The Supplemental Agreement stated that "[t]he Company shall contribute the
full premium or subscription charge for Health ('are ... coverages continued in accordance A ith
Article Ill, Section 5, for: (i) a retired employee (including any eligible dependents) provided such
retired employee is eligible for benefits under Article II of the Company's Hourly-Rate Employees
Pension Plan .... The Health Care... coverages an employee has under this Article at the time of
retirement ... shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for continuation
can be made with the Carrier(s)." Id. at 419. Furthermore, "the Supplemental Agreement similarly
tied retirees' spouses' medical benefits to pension benefits." Id.; see also Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 73 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 1996).
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the CBA by reference.' 63 In other words, the CBA language alluded to the
Supplemental Agreement on the subject of pension plans and insurance
programs, and thus the Supplemental Agreement provided intrinsic-rather than
extrinsic-evidence about the contractual intent of the parties. 
1 64
Finally, in distinguishing the force and effect of the employer's reservation-
of-rights clause from its anti-employer injunction, the Sixth Circuit held that this
clause operated simply to "alert [future retirees] that the company may
discontinue the retirement benefits of employees who have yet to retire when the
agreement ends."1 65 Thus, the Sixth Circuit has favored employees a bit more
recently but only where the contractual language strongly links health benefits
and vested pension benefits. 1
66
iv) Cherry v. Auburn Gear, Inc. (2006)167
Three years after its stark treatment of union-employer disputes over welfare
benefits in Rockford Powertrain, 168 the Seventh Circuit confronted a more
determined union litigant. In this case, the retirees' former employer instituted
various changes over the preceding two decades that increased retiree co-
payments and charged monthly premiums. These changes culminated with
Auburn Gear's notification in 2002 of its intention to terminate retiree benefits
outright, and the union responded by having its active employees strike
immediately. 
169
Ruling against the retirees, the court progressed through the same contract
principles as in previous cases to arrive at its decision. Reviving its language
from earlier decisions, it admitted that "this story does not have a happy ending":
We are mindful of the burden placed upon retired individuals with fixed
income who now must bear an unexpected increase in healthcare
costs. "However, we are bound to determine only whether a legally sufficient
agreement between the parties exists to support plaintiffs' claim." If a union
",want[s] to assure that employer-paid health benefits for the workers they
represent are vested[,] they will have to insist on explicit language to this
163. McCoy, 390 F.3d at 423-24.
164. See id. at 419.
165. Id. at 425.
166. See Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting the critical linkage of
retiree health benefits to pension plan benefits); Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571
(6th Cir. 2006).
167. 441 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2006).
168. UAW v. Rockford Powertrain, Inc., 350 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Barnett v.
Ameren Corp., 436 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that retiree health benefits do not vest unless
there is an unambiguous indication in the agreement that they do).
169. 441 F.3d at 479-81.
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effect." In this case, Union failed to obtain the necessary contractual language.
The distinction between lifetime benefits and vested benefits is "a legal
distinction that understandably escaped" many of the retirees. "It is difficult to
imagine that someone without legal training would be able to fully comprehend
a reservation of rights clause and how the court would interpret such a clause."
To avoid this information gap, Union representatives must be mindful of their
responsibility to deliver the benefits they have promised and not guarantee
benefits they have failed to obtain through explicit contractual language.
The contractual language at issue in this case was clear: "lifetime" benefits
extended only so long as the collectively bargained insurance agreement
remained in effect. 1
70
Thus, the Seventh Circuit has been consistently unsympathetic to retiree efforts
to protect their evaporating health care benefits, as the law of ERISA and
contractual principles weigh heavily against retirees.
v) Coffin v. Bowater Inc. (2007)171
Finally, the First Circuit joined this parade by allowing a subsequent benefit
plan adoption to unilaterally abrogate the health care benefits that retirees
possessed under a predecessor arrangement. In a convoluted situation involving a
subsidiary's acquisition and subsequent disposition, Bowater Inc. argued that
such transactions automatically terminate a parent company's health benefit
obligations to that subsidiary's retirees. On this point, the court held for the
retirees, noting that "parent companies tend to terminate ERISA plans wxhen
selling a subsidiary, [but] there is nothing automatic about this correlation." "' -
Such companies, according to the court, must satisfy certain procedural
requirements in ERISA that "alert employees that the parent was terminating
responsibility for its welfare benefits upon the sale of the subsidiary.""
The First Circuit then noted the applicable requirements:
[A]n ERISA plan amendment must be in writing; it must be executed by a party
authorized to amend the plan; the language of the amendment must clearly alert
the parties that the plan is being amended; and the amendment must meet any
other requirements laid out for such amendments in the plans governing
documents. 174
These requirements, the court observed, were not met by the stock purchase
170. Id. at 486 (citations omitted).
171. 501 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2007).
172. Id. at 88.
173. I.
174. Id. at 91-92.
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agreement that Bowater executed when it sold the relevant subsidiary. 175
The retirees' victory, however, was short-lived. In 2003, Bowater
established a "unified plan to replace the various plans under which its
employees received health and welfare benefits."' 176 This "unified plan" excluded
Mr. Coffin and the other retiree-plaintiffs, and the plan's explicit declaration that
it "supersedes and replaces any program document defining the terms of or
describing a Benefit Program that is not incorporated and made part of the Plan"
meant that the retirees' benefits were no more. 177
2. The Non-Unionized Workplace
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit and selected other circuits' cases that may
follow Yard-Man in a union context, courts historically do not recognize a
presumption or inference of vesting of benefits in unbargained-for welfare plans,
nor are they inclined to distinguish between general and specific duration clauses.
As such, courts interpreting contracts are less friendly to retirees with
unbargained-for retiree health benefit plans. For example, in the 1995 case of In
re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit "ERISA " Litigation, 78 the Third Circuit
considered whether an employer could unilaterally reduce retiree health benefits
where the plan described the duration of benefits as "lifetime" and "rest of your
life," while at the same time expressly reserving the employer's right to terminate
or change benefits under the plan for any reason. 179 Absent any consideration of
a vesting inference, the court reconciled the arguably inconsistent language by
reasoning that "the promise made to [the Unisys] retirees was a qualified one: the
promise was that retiree medical benefits were for life provided the company
chose not to terminate the plans, pursuant to clauses that preserved the
company's right to end them at any time or for any reason.'18 In other words,
even "vested" retiree health benefits are conditional upon an employer's
continued willingness to provide such benefits-a rather nuanced interpretation,
to say the least, of what "vested" benefits represent.
Similarly, in Sprague v. General Motors,181 retirees challenged General
Motors' (GM) ability to unilaterally terminate retiree welfare benefits as reserved
in the plan document, but in contradiction to a subsequent SPD that promised
lifetime benefits without alluding to GM's right to terminate. The Sixth Circuit
held that the plan terms and the SPD were not inconsistent, because the plans and
175. Id. at91.
176. Id. at 92.
177. Id. at 93.
178. 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995).
179. Id. at 904.
180. Id. at 904 n.12.
181. 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).
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the SPDs unambiguously reserved GM's right to amend or terminate the plan. In
addressing whether omissions in a SPD about vesting of medical benefits could
create an ambiguity between the plan and SPD, the court answered in the
negative because "Congress did not require [disclosure of] such information for
welfare plans; neither did the Department of Labor in its ERISA reporting and
disclosure regulations."'18 2 The court addressed the issue of whether there is a
presumption of vesting by stating,
To vest benefits is to render them forever unalterable. Because vesting of
welfare plan benefits is not required by law, an employer's commitment to vest
such benefits is not to be inferred lightly; the intent to vest must be found in the
plan documents and must be stated in clear and express language. 183
The Sixth Circuit ultimately reasoned that GM had made a qualified promise
to provide lifetime retiree health benefits, a promise that held true as long as the
company did not change its mind. Such an interpretation renders whatever
benefits retirees continue to receive a mere gratuity, a product of GM's
forbearance, or perhaps its generosity.
The following is a sampling of recent cases of non-union retiree vesting
claims that underscore the legally precarious position of retirees with regard to
post-employment health benefits.
a. Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield (2001)184 and Devlin
v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield (2001) i"'
Plaintiff-retirees left employment either through the ordinary course of
business or through early retirement severance packages between 1989 and
1998.186 Both cases involved the same fact pattern, except that the Devlin retirees
based their claims on pre-1987 SPDs, while the Abbruscato retirees focused on
benefit plan descriptions from 1987 and beyond. The key difference between the
two cases was that a newly written employee handbook ("Your Handbook")
introduced in 1987 was the first version to include a reservation-of-rights clause.
This handbook provided that "the company expects and intends to continue the
Plans in your Benefits Program indefinitely, but reserves its right to end each of
the Plans, if necessary. The company also reserves its right to amend each of the
Plans at any time."'
Those plaintiffs accepting early retirement packages received xritten
182. Id. at 402.
183. Id. at 400.
184. 274 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2001).
185. 274 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2001).
186. Abbruscato, 274 F.3d at 93.
187. Id. at 94.
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materials that described the specialized terms of their incentive-laden departures,
and both plans contained reservation-of-rights language concerning the
benefits.1 88 Furthermore, the early retirement packages included a "Separation
Agreement and General Release" in which the employer "reserve[d] the right to
change or eliminate, at any time, these retiree medical and life insurance
benefits" and asserted that "the agreement constituted the sole and complete
understanding between the parties. ' 189 Thus, there were three categories of
plaintiffs across these two cases: 1) pre-1987 SPD regular retirees in Devlin
whose plan lacked a reservation-of-rights clause, 2) "Your Handbook" regular
retirees from 1987 forward who were subject to a reservation-of-rights clause,
and 3) early retirees whose plans also contained a reservation-of-rights clause.
As to the early retirees, the Abbruscato court found that there were intrinsic
grounds in the plans to create ambiguity about the meaning of "lifetime" benefits
and overturned the lower court's summary judgment for Empire. 190 The Second
Circuit deemed the eligibility formulas to conflict with the generalized
reservation-of-rights clauses found elsewhere in the plans. The purported
reservation clauses could be "interpreted to mean that Empire merely reserved
the right to change the program for those individuals who have not already
retired under the terms described, not the right to alter the described benefits for
those individuals who had retired under those terms."' 191
By contrast, the same court found no such ambiguity that would allow the
"Your Handbook" regular retirees to pursue their benefit claims against Empire.
Instead, the Second Circuit ruled that a generalized reservation-of-rights clause
plus termination language about a specific benefit provided a clear message to
retirees about the nonvesting nature of their benefits.' 92 One commentator's
reading of Abbruscato's holding explained that "employees cannot reasonably
believe that their benefits are vested if the same document that promises lifetime
benefits also clearly informs employees that those benefits are subject to
change." 
93
Finally, the court upheld the motion of the pre-1987 SPD plaintiffs in Devlin
by ruling that there was adequate written language in the SPDs "'capable of
reasonably being interpreted as creating a promise' to survive an employer's
summary judgment motion."' 194 Since the pre-1987 SPDs lacked a reservation-of-
rights clause, and certain other sentences read that "retired employees, after
188. Id. at 94-95.
189. Id. at 95.
190. Id. at 98.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 99.
193. Kemp, supra note 103, at 19.
194. Devlin, 274 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Am. Fed'n of Grain Millers v. Int'l
Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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[meeting a condition precedent] will be insured" and that life insurance benefits
"will remain at [the annual salary] level for the remainder of their lives," there
were reasonable grounds to interpret an intent to vest life insurance benefits. 195
Setting aside their intricacies, the two Empire cases demonstrate that the
evidentiary burden on retirees makes it difficult to even withstand an employer's
summary judgment motion, let alone defeat an employer's benefits-slashing. The
Empire retirees required either 1) an absence of an employer reservation-of-rights
clause (in the case of pre-1987 plaintiffs), or 2) an SPD containing a generalized
reservation-of-rights clause coupled with a specific clause that was sufficiently
ambiguous in order to proceed. Thus, a generalized reservation-of-rights clause,
standing alone, is apparently sufficient to sustain an employer's motion for
summary judgment.
b. Stearns v. NCR Corp. (2002)196
A group of early retirees brought suit against their former employer for
reducing health benefits granted to them in their severance package. 9 7 The
plaintiffs accepted an Enhanced Retirement Program package in 1993 that
provided, inter alia, a better health care package than was currently offered under
the company's standard medical plan.1 98 Six years later, the company instituted
sweeping changes, including higher premiums, increased deductibles and co-
payments, and cancellation of the company's Medicare supplement plan.' 99
Plaintiff Steams represented the retiree class, arguing that NCR's purported
reservation-of-rights provision in the Plan Amendment subsection of the group
benefits plan was invalid.
The Eighth Circuit ruled for the employer, citing its precedent from Hughes
v. 3M Retiree Medical Plan200 that an unambiguous reservation-of-rights
provision is sufficient to defeat a claim that retirement welfare plan benefits are
vested. 20 1 Explaining the framework of contract analysis, the court said that
extrinsic evidence could only be considered in cases of facial ambiguity or
conflict with other plan provisions.20 2 Finding neither situation, the Eighth
Circuit held that NCR could terminate benefits according to the reservation-of-
rights clause.
195. Id. at 84-85 (internal quotation marks removed).
196. 297 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2002).
197. Id. at 708.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 709.
200. 281 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2002).
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c. Bland v. Fiatallis North America, Inc. (2005)203
In this case, there was no reservation-of-rights clause. The plaintiff-retirees
protested their employer's "onion solution" to gradually peel away layers of
retiree benefits over time, and initiated suit on grounds that the contract language
was ambiguous and subject to extrinsic evidence of an intent to vest.20 4 The
Seventh Circuit recognized that although health benefits do not vest
automatically, they may be so triggered by an affirmative contractual promise by
the employer.20 5 While the court noted that a contract that is silent about vesting
holds a presumption that the employer did not intend to grant vested benefits, this
presumption is defeated by what Judge Richard Posner called "any positive
indication of ambiguity, [or] something to make you scratch your head., 20 6 The
Seventh Circuit was made to scratch its proverbial head in this case, as plaintiff-
retirees pointed to multiple instances of "life-time" language in the plan
documents, even though there was no explicit promise to vest nor any reservation
of a right to modify benefits.20 7 Ultimately, in the absence of contrary evidence
where the language was ambiguous, the Seventh Circuit determined that
"lifetime" within the plan documents was used as a durational term that equated
to "good for life unless revoked or modified.' 20 8 Accordingly, it reversed the
lower court's granting of summary judgment for the employer and remanded the
case to decide the scope of vested benefits that were ostensibly promised by the
employer.
d. Boubolis v. Transport Workers Union ofAmerica (2006)209
In an interesting twist on the typical fact situation, this case presents an
employee union as the benefits-slashing employer. The plaintiff-retirees were
former New York City Transit Authority workers who became staff employees
of the local union chapter, Local 100, of the Transport Workers Union of
America. 210 The retirees alleged that they were given assurances at various
junctures during their employment with Local 100 that they would have "lifetime
health insurance coverage" under Local 100's plan, which provided better health
benefits than those available to them as former employees of the Transit
Authority. 211 Accordingly, when new union leadership of Local 100 terminated
203. 401 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2005).
204. Id. at 781-82.
205. Id. at 783-84.
206. Id. at 784.
207. Id. at 785.
208. Id. at 786.
209. 442 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2006).
210. Id. at 58.
211. Id.
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the health care benefits of all retirees who were otherwise eligible for health
insurance coverage from another employer, these retirees sued to enforce their
right to be covered by Local 100's plan rather than the inferior Transit Authority
plan.21 2
The retirees first argued that their health benefits were "lifetime" in nature
because, although the SPD lacked explicit vesting language, it listed only two
conditions-ceasing employment and death-by which benefits could
213terminate. Because they were already retired, plaintiffs reasoned that they
could lose their benefits only upon death; i.e., the end of their lifetime.214
Unfortunately for the retirees, the Second Circuit rejected this argument based on
the widely held rule that the absence of vesting language does not create a
promise to vest by the employer. The SPD therefore did not, on its own, vest
lifetime health care benefits in the retirees.215
Boubolis shows that even the unions that bargain with employers and pursue
litigation in the interests of their employees can have an alter-ego as a self-
interested employer or business entity. In this situation, the union engaged in the
same sort of objectionable action that it would normally oppose on behalf of its
members. By cutting retiree benefits and breaking its promise, regardless of
whether the retirees had available insurance coverage from another source, the
union maligned and disenfranchised its retirees exactly as employers have done
in the ERISA-related vesting cases. And as in the vast majority of other benefits
cases, the employer is legally allowed to do so under the courts' interpretation of
ERISA. 216
Because retirees' vesting arguments are rarely successful in either the union
or the non-union context, plaintiffs invariably allege that the employer's actions
breached its fiduciary duties. It is this type of action-breach of the fiduciary
duty-to which we now turn.
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
Because ERISA mandates that employers acting as benefit plan
administrators are performing fiduciary functions, the oral representations that
are made by human resources personnel and other benefits-related personnel in a





216. See, e.g., Balestracci v. NSTAR Electric & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 2006)
(affirming summary judgment for the employer due to the SPD's reservation of the right to
terminate "lifetime" dental benefits, even though informal summaries provided to early retirees did
not disclose this right).
1X:2 (2009)
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employees have been told one thing about their expected benefits, but the
company later does the opposite, it is possible that the employer breached its
fiduciary duties of disclosure, care, and loyalty to the employee-beneficiaries
(and future retirees). Such factual scenarios are especially common in cases of
early retirement plans where employees, after having been assured that no
sweetened severance packages would be forthcoming, depart the company before
an enhanced package is unveiled shortly thereafter. As the case law in this area
points out, plaintiffs who are seeking restitution for lost benefits must meet two
significant evidentiary hurdles. First, they must show that an employer's
misrepresentative communication was material. Second, they must substantiate
the requisite scienter, or intent threshold, underlying the employer's material
misrepresentation, a standard that varies from circuit to circuit. Stated somewhat
differently, employees must prove that the company made a significant-rather
than trivial-misrepresentation that was either intentionally fraudulent or merely
negligent, depending on the circuit involved.
These hurdles originate from the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Varity Corp. v. Howe,2 17 the first case to recognize an actionable claim for breach
of fiduciary duty under ERISA. In that case, corporate management affirmatively
advised and purposefully induced employees to switch their benefit plans from
the parent company to an insolvent shell-company subsidiary in a dubious cost-
cutting scheme. 218 The Supreme Court held that the employer's misconduct
violated its ERISA fiduciary duties, 219 yet it left open the questions of 1) what
constitutes a material misrepresentation, and 2) whether deceitful intent by the
employer is required to make an employee's fiduciary breach claim actionable.
These issues were addressed recently by the Seventh Circuit in Beach v.
Commonwealth Edison Co.220 and Vallone v. CNA Financial Corp.221
1. When Are an Employer's Oral Misrepresentations "Material "?
Beach involved an employee who retired six weeks prior to the
announcement of a voluntary separation package amid adamant company
assurances that no such plan would be offered anytime soon.2 22 The Seventh
Circuit ruled on behalf of the employer that, inter alia, the verbal
misrepresentations made by the company's representatives to the plaintiff were
not material, because the early retirement package that was eventually offered
was not sufficiently developed when the misrepresentations were made. In other
217. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
218. Id. at 493-94.
219. Id. at 506-07.
220. 382 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004).
221. 375 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2004).
222. Beach, 382 F.3d at 657.
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words, what turned out to be a misrepresentation (e.g., "a new early retirement
plan won't be offered") may not have been so at the time it was made, because
the alternative plan had not yet achieved sufficient managerial ratification. Mr.
Beach failed to show that the formative stages of the voluntary separation
package were already underway and that its disclosure to employees would have
been material to his retirement decision.223
The standard used in Beach to determine whether a fiduciary breach has
22been committed is known as the Serious Consideration Doctrine. z24 Under this
standard, "a duty of accurate disclosure begins when 1) a specific proposal 2) is
being discussed for purposes of implementation 3) by senior management with
the authority to implement the change . . . . At that point, details of the
amendment become material; until then, there is only speculation.', 22
The Seventh Circuit found that the employer's misrepresentations were not
material and that the employer had no duty to disclose managerial speculation
regarding possible benefits plan changes.226  In endorsing the Serious
Consideration Doctrine, the court concluded that the certainty of the deal's
structure is the touchstone for triggering disclosure to employees. 227 The court
also warned that absent a Serious Consideration Doctrine threshold, high-level
executives might ostracize benefits counselors to avoid the risk of confidential
strategies being prematurely shared with employees.228 Such action would render
human resources personnel useless and might breed rumor circulation and
mistrust among employees within the company.22 9
Beach's endorsement of the Serious Consideration Doctrine finds significant
support in the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.23 °
The Second and Fifth Circuits, however, have departed from the Serious
Consideration Doctrine's rigidity, holding that materiality of information is not
solely a function of the employer's internal deliberations.231 Instead, these
223. Id.
224. Id. at 659-60.
225. Id. at 659 (internal citations omitted).
226. Id. at 660-61.
227. Id. at 659-60.
228. Id. at 660 ("Giving firms a duty to forecast accurately would just induce employers to
tell the human resources staff to say nothing at all.").
229. Id.
230. Id.; see, e.g., Mathews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1180-82 (9th Cir. 2004); Bins v.
Exxon Co. U.S.A., 220 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); McAuley v. Int'l Bus. Mach.
Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1043 (6th Cir. 1999), Vartanian x. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 272 (1st Cir.
1997); Hockett v. Sun Co., Inc., 109 F.3d 1515, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997); Wilson v. Sw.. Bell Tel.
Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1995); Elmore x. Cone Mills Corp., 23 F.3d 855, 861 (4th Cir.
1994) (stating that a plan "must actually be in existence; the mere decision to create an
employee benefit plan is not actionable") Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 539, 544 (11 th Cir. 1991).
231. See Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411-12 (5th Cir. 2003); Ballone N.
IX:2 (2009)
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Circuits have fashioned what I will call the "Expansive Materiality" standard,
which essentially equates to a totality of the circumstances test. 232 This standard
focuses on the materiality of the information-that is, the material impact that
such information may have on an employee's retirement decision-and takes into
account the employer's "serious consideration" factors as just a few of many
variables that are part of the decision-making process. According to these
Circuits, the Serious Consideration Doctrine has a fatal flaw in its operation: a
"free zone for lying" may arise in which a benefits administrator could
knowingly deny or mislead employees simply because plan changes had not
achieved sufficient internal ratification.233
In Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 23 4 the Second Circuit ruled that the
materiality of Kodak's misrepresentations was not solely predicated upon the
Serious Consideration Doctrine's three-pronged test. Rather, the materiality
inquiry should be whether an employer's misrepresentation was substantially
likely to mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed
retirement decision. 235 To assess such materiality, the court held that variables
beyond the Serious Consideration Doctrine, such as the egregiousness of the
misrepresentation and the availability of contrary extrinsic evidence, should be
weighed.236 The Fifth Circuit's Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd.237 decision
further refined the Expansive Materiality Test, holding that the key to assessing
materiality was whether a reasonable person would have considered the
misrepresentation important in his early-retirement decision.238 In that regard, the
court held that an employer's statement that it had not made a decision whether
"to roll out an enhanced benefits plan in the future. . could not have been
material or misleading until [that employer] had actually decided to implement
such a plan.,
239
Disagreement among the circuits between the Serious Consideration
Doctrine and the Expansive Materiality Test highlights the varying evidentiary
burdens incumbent upon employee-retiree plaintiffs to substantiate a claim that
an employer breached its fiduciary duty. While materiality has different
meanings in different courts, it is evident that proving materiality is a particularly
Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1997).
232. See sources cited supra note 231.
233. See Beach v. Commonwealth Edison, 388 F.3d 1133, 1135 (7th Cir. 2004) (Ripple, J.,
dissenting); Martinez, 338 F.3d at 428.
234. 109 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1997).
235. Id. at 122-23.
236. Id. at 125 (stating that materiality of false assurances could be assessed by factors
independent of the Serious Consideration Doctrine).
237. 338 F.3d 407, 428 (5th Cir. 2003) (adopting Ballone's materiality approach).
238. Id. (the overarching question is the impact on employee's retirement decision).
239. Id. at 431.
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challenging burden faced by employee-retirees. Moreover, as discussed below,
even if the materiality threshold is met, plaintiffs must then prove that the
employer's actions were intentional or negligent.
2. Need To Prove Negligence or Fraudulent Intent
ERISA imposes on fiduciaries a duty of loyalty and a prudent-man duty of
care. 24 Assessing these duties, the Supreme Court in Varity held that lying to
employees in the context of benefits administration violates the fiduciary
obligation. 241 Accordingly, the easy case of intentional deceit, or disinformation,
by employers was uniformly adopted by the federal bench as a violation of
242'ERISA. But what happens when a fiduciary is not lying, but rather
unintentionally conveys a material misrepresentation whose falsity is unknown
by him? Must there be deceptive intent, or "scienter, ' ' 243 in an employer's actions
to allow a fiduciary breach claim? On this issue, the federal circuits are
divided.244
In Vallone v. CNA Financial Corp. ,245 the Seventh Circuit upheld the
employer's termination of early-retirees' "lifetime" welfare benefits based on a
contractual reservation-of-rights provision. The court held that, under Varit, and
other Seventh Circuit precedents, "an employer must have set out to disadvantage
or deceive its employees.., in order for a breach of fiduciary duty" claim to
succeed.24 6 Thus, unless an employer engages in intentional misconduct, or
disinformation, employees lose out under current law;247 breach of the fiduciary
duty arises only through intentional wrongdoing.248
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit, some have argued "[t]he Second, Third,
and Sixth Circuits have interpreted Varity as permitting claims against a fiduciary
even in the absence of ... intentional misconduct so long as materially
240. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
241. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996).
242. See WILBER H. BOLES & NANCY G. Ross, COMMUNICATING WITH EIPLOYEES ABOUT
BENEFITS: A CENTRAL ISSUE IN ERISA ADMINISTRATION AND LITIGATION 522 (Practising Law Inst.
2001) (describing and analyzing standards used by appellate courts).
243. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004) ("A degree of knowledge that makes a
person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission . A mental state
consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.").
244. See Beach v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 382 F.3d 656, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2004) (Ripple,
J., dissenting) (illustrating that disagreement exists regarding the scienter requirement).
245. 375 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2004).
246. Id. at 642 (endorsing intentional deception standard necessary for breach of fiduciary
duty).
247. Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Seventh Circuit, Vallone, 375 F.3d (No.
04-502), 2004 WL 2326794.
248. 375 F.3d at 640 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996)).
IX:2 (2009)
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misleading information was provided by the fiduciary.- 249 If inadvertently
incorrect information, or "misinformation," was conveyed, a claim for fiduciary
breach is possible as long as the information provided was materially
misleading. 250 The key is that an employee's subjective evaluation of the
information matters as much as the actual truth of the information provided. If
misinformation is conveyed to an employee who internalizes and acts on it, a
breach claim can be levied.251
According to the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits, as well as Judge
Ripple's dissent in the Beach case, "importing the intent to deceive requirement
into this type of ERISA fiduciary case lacks any grounding." 2 Rather,
unintentional misrepresentations suffice as actionable grounds for breach of the
fiduciary duty on several bases. First, per Congressional intent and Varity's
decree, ERISA duties have greater force than their common law trust pedigree
and are more onerous than simply avoiding fraud.253 Second, analogizing ERISA
duties to agency law's apparent authority doctrine suggests that a beneficiary's
reasonable reliance is important in assessing fiduciary liability, whereas a
fiduciary's subjective intent is irrelevant.254 Third, while ERISA's trust law roots
make no mention of scienter, they do indicate duties to inform and not misinform
beneficiaries; a trustee must convey to its beneficiary all material facts related to
a transaction that the "trustee knows or should know., 255 Thus, reckless
misinformation may be actionable when an employer should have known
better.256
In contrast to its sister courts, the Seventh Circuit endorses a strict
"disinformation" standard for breach of the ERISA fiduciary duty, a standard
whose turnkey issue is employer intent.257 The Seventh Circuit applied this
scienter requirement in Vallone, eviscerating retirees' breach claim by showing
249. Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Seventh Circuit, supra note 247, at * 1.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Beach, 382 F. 3d at 668 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (denouncing Seventh Circuit's
endorsement in dicta of employer scienter requirement).
253. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (noting that the legislative intent in
enacting ERISA was in part to enhance the common law of trusts).
254. RESTATEMENT (TiiIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) (apparent
authority doctrine); see also Beach, 382 F.3d at 669-70 (Ripple, J., dissenting). The apparent
authority doctrine is especially poignant because it imposes liability on a corporation that otherwise
might circumvent its ERISA obligations by erecting a "Chinese wall" between its plan
administrator-a fiduciary-and its human resources counselors who may have non-fiduciary
status.
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
256. See Beach v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 382 F.3d 656, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) (Ripple, J.,
dissenting).
257. See Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2004).
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that there was no evidence of purposeful deception akin to Varity's "campaign of
disinformation. 258
The Vallone court justified its "disinformation" approach on grounds of
allegiance to Varity's scienter requirement and the need to avoid excessive
burdens on employers in their duty of care. 259 First, the "disinformation" theory
asserts that future changed circumstances that are unanticipated at the time of a
fiduciary-beneficiary communication cannot provide grounds for fiduciary
liability. 260 A fiduciary that believes its actions serve the best interests of its
beneficiaries cannot, by definition, be in breach of ERISA's § 1004(a)(1) duty of
loyalty.261 Second, by distinguishing ERISA's duty of loyalty from its duty of
care, and showing that the duty of care is not breached by negligence in a
corporate fiduciary context, the court denounces negligence as too low a liability
standard for ERISA plan administration.262 Finally, the Seventh Circuit took a
holistic view of ERISA's duty of care provision by saying that a fiduciary's
overall diligence in benefits plan management overrides any discrete instances of
oral advice.263 Thus, the court essentially subjugated the importance of a benefits
administrator's communications to his investment and management activities.: 64
To summarize, Varity stands for the undeniable proposition that employer
deceit violates ERISA. An employer-fiduciary may not actively lie to employees
if and when it chooses to communicate with them, whether through a
nonfiduciary agent or by its own accord. Beyond this insidious intent that ERISA
condemns outright, the Varity court strongly implied that materiality of
information is the touchstone for substantiating breach of fiduciary duty. How
this materiality should be judged forms the basis of the present circuit split over
the Serious Consideration Doctrine versus the Expansive Materiality Test.
Furthermore, either the negligence or intent characterizing an employer's
misrepresentation is integral to courts' upholding breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Viewing these requirements holistically, their inconsistent judicial
interpretations, and the significant evidentiary burdens faced by employees, it is
fair to say that fiduciary breach actions are exceedingly difficult for employee-
retirees to maintain against their employers. As a result, retirees often resort to
258. Id. at 641 (Count III for Breach of Fiduciary Duty fails).
259. Id. at 640-43 (explaining rejection of negligence standard and adoption of intent
requirement).
260. Scc id. at 641-42; Frahm v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 137 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir.
1998) (duty of loyalty is unequal to clairvoyance).
261. Sec Frahm, 137 F.3d at 959 (fiduciaries not engaged in Varitv-type deceit, but rather
acted loyally in what they believed to be beneficiaries' best interests).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 960 (overall management of the plan, and specifically asset management, is
targeted by the duty of care).
264. Id. at 959-61.
IX:2 (2009)
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estoppel claims alleging their reasonable reliance on employer misrepresentations
that detrimentally impacted their retirement decision-making.
D. Estoppel Claims
Estoppel claims provide the last legal avenue for retirees seeking protection
or restoration of their lost health care benefits. Estoppel theories posit that the
defendant made a false representation that the plaintiff relied upon to the
plaintiffs detriment. In the context of the retiree benefits, the hypothetical
employer falsely stated orally and informally (equitable estoppel under common
law) or in a quasi-contractual writing (promissory estoppel under ERISA), and
beyond the terms of the SPD, that benefits were indefinite or interminable and
that this statement induced the retiree to take reasonable action that ultimately
damaged his interests. In analyzing the relevant case law in this area, the
distinction between promissory and equitable estoppel is inconsequential.
Across retiree health benefit cases, all circuits require the plaintiffs to
establish the basic elements of estoppel to prevail on an estoppel claim. 265 While
the various circuits differ slightly in describing these elements,266  the
fundamental components are 1) a material misrepresentation, 2) reasonable and
detrimental reliance upon the representation, and 3) extraordinary and extreme
circumstances.267 Plaintiffs have experienced daunting obstacles in proving the
requisite "material" (or "knowing") nature of the employer's misrepresentation,
the "reasonableness" of their own actions in reliance, and the "extraordinariness"
of the factual circumstances surrounding their cases.
1. Material Misrepresentation
As with fiduciary claims, the material misrepresentation element of estoppel
claims is particularly difficult for retirees to substantiate due to the onerous
evidentiary requirements. For a misrepresentation to be material, courts generally
require that the employer-administrator knowingly provided false information to
the employee-retirees. Scienter thus becomes an issue, as "knowing
misrepresentation" apparently has fraudulent undertones, meaning that plaintiffs
must prove that the employer purposely misled the plaintiffs. The Vallone court,
265. Kemp, supra note 103, at 23.
266. As an example of courts differing in explaining their estoppel test, the Seventh Circuit
requires 1) a knowing misrepresentation 2) in writing 3) reasonably relied upon 4) to the plaintiffs
detriment, which the court limits to a "'narrow scope" of cases justified by extreme circumstances,
Vallone v. CNA Financial, 375 F.3d 623, 639 (7th Cir. 2004), while the Second Circuit explains it
as 1) a promise 2) relied upon 3) causing injury 4) resulting in injustice if not enforced, and it also
requires "extraordinary circumstances," Devlin %. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76,
85-86 (2d Cir. 2001).
267. Kemp, supra note 103, at 23.
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for example, seized upon the employer's lack of deceitful intent in finding
against the retirees. The Seventh Circuit there said that
the plaintiffs have not shown a knowing misrepresentation of fact. Although
"[r]epresentations about plans and intentions could be false if, at the time the
statements were made, the speaker actually had a different intention," the
district court found that, at the time the VSRP was offered, [the company] had
no intention of terminating the "lifetime" HCA benefit.
268
The Second Circuit has also referred to the evidentiary need to show
employer fraud in an estoppel claim. In Moore v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,269 the court had to decide whether nonplan documents and oral
communications legitimately modified the terms of the welfare plan. The plan
and SPD both mentioned the employer's power to amend or terminate retiree
health benefits, but the employer's informational programs and filmstrips did not.
The court commented that "absent a showing tantamount to proof of fraud, an
ERISA welfare plan is not subject to amendment as a result of informal
communications between an employer and plan beneficiaries.,, 270 The court
further explained that:
Congress intended that plan documents and the SPDs exclusively govern an
employer's obligations under ERISA plans . . . .Were all communications
between an employer and plan beneficiaries to be considered along with the
SPDs as establishing the terms of a welfare plan, the plan documents and the
SPDs would establish merely a floor for an employer's future obligations.
Predictability as to the extent of future obligations would be lost, and,
consequently, substantial disincentives for even offering such plans would be
created.271
Thus, in addition to finding employer behavior bordering on fraud to constitute
"knowing misrepresentation" in the estoppel context, courts also look to the
written plan documents and SPDs as powerful defensive shields against estoppel
claims.
2. Reasonability of Reliance
Even if plaintiff-retirees overcome the material misrepresentation challenge,
they must prove the reasonable reliance element of estoppel. Courts have
268. Vallone, 375 F.3d at 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Frahm v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 137 F.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1998)) (holding that the employer's statement was not a
knowing misrepresentation).
269. 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988).
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concluded that if reservation-of-rights clauses and other written plan provisions
indicate an employer's right to modify or limit benefits, it is not objectively
reasonable for the plaintiffs to rely on any alleged statements to the contrary. The
Third Circuit explained this rationale in In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical
Benefit "ERISA " Litigation,272 where an unambiguous reservation-of-rights
clause in the SPD eviscerated the reasonableness of plaintiff-retirees' reliance on
a benefits administrator's oral interpretation of the plan that conflicted with the
SPD.273 In an earlier case, Frahm v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States,274 the Seventh Circuit similarly observed that "[i]n federal law, a
person cannot rely on an oral statement, when he has in hand written materials
disclosing the truth. 275
Even among courts that go beyond the bounds of ERISA-based estoppel,
there is often little relief for retirees. For example, the Eleventh Circuit
recognizes a very narrow common law doctrine of equitable estoppel that
requires 1) ambiguous written provisions, coupled with 2) informal
interpretations of the ambiguous provisions made by the benefits provider, but
even then, an unambiguous benefits plan defeats retirees' estoppel claims.
276
Lastly, the reliance aspect clearly requires that an employee-retiree act
subsequent to an employer's alleged misrepresentation, rather than before it. In
the case of UA W v. Rockford Powertrain, Inc.,277 the Seventh Circuit concluded
that it was impossible for the plaintiffs to have relied on their employer's
statements in making their retirement decision, because "plaintiffs admit[ted] in
their brief that the statements at issue were made 'during exit interviews after the
retirees made their decisions to retire."'
278
3. Extraordinary Circumstances
The final prerequisite to successful estoppel claims is showing the
"extraordinary circumstances" context of the employer-retiree dispute. The
Seventh Circuit has commented that, "[a]s a guideline for the boundaries of
ERISA estoppel, [the court has] emphasized the 'narrow scope' of estoppel
272. 58 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1995).
273. Id. at 907-08 (unambiguous reservation-of-rights clause means plaintiffs' reliance on
contrary statements was unreasonable).
274. 137 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998).
275. Id. at 961; see also Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 640 (7th Cir. 2004)
(plaintiffs reliance not reasonable).
276. See, e.g., Jones v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1065, 1069-71 (1 1th Cir.
2004). "[A]n ERISA plaintiff can only succeed. . if he can establish that the plan at issue is at
least ambiguous with respect to the relevant benefits for which he claims entitlement." Id. at 1170.
277. 350 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003).
278. Id. at 705-06.
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claims and [has] noted that 'only extreme circumstances' justify such claims.' 279
While the standard to constitute extraordinary circumstances is apparently an
assessment of all the facts, it seems clear nonetheless that courts are hesitant to
find such circumstances. In Devlin v. Transportation Communications
International Union, 28 an employer unexpectedly amended the retirees' welfare
plan by replacing free medical coverage with monthly premiums, contradicting
previous informal company statements, letters, and sworn affidavits.
28 1
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit refused to find "extraordinary circumstances,"
because it found "no evidence to suggest that employers sought the retirement of
any of the [employees] or that the promise of free, lifetime health benefits was
used to intentionally induce any particular behavior on the [employees'] part.,
282
Accordingly, the Second Circuit has grafted a fraudulent or deceptive
inducement element onto its "extraordinary circumstances" evaluation process.
Using this yardstick, the court found extraordinary circumstances present in the
two Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield cases (Devlin and Abbruscato).23 Based
on management depositions in these cases, the Second Circuit determined that
the employer had used promises of full benefits to initially garner and
subsequently retain qualified employees for many years:
[A] trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Empire intentionally promised
lifetime life insurance benefits to lure (and retain) employees away from other
firms paying higher salaries and then denied those benefits after the employees
were of an age where they could neither make up the salary difference or obtain
alternative benefits at a reasonable cost.284
Thus, for the nonearly retirees who sued the employer in Devlin, their long
years of service were seen by the court as legitimately reasonable reliance on a
promise that was ultimately broken by the employer. Furthermore, in
Abbruscato, the Second Circuit found that a benefit accrued to the employer by
the employees accepting early retirement:
[A]ppellants ... have presumably conferred a benefit on Empire, and pre\ ented
it from having to resort to salary reductions, layoffs or firings during those
years. A trier of fact could reasonably find that Empire intentionally induced
279. Vallone, 375 F.3d at 639 (citing Sandstrom v. Cultor Food Science, 214 F.3d 795, 797
(7th Cir. 2000)).
280. 173 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 1999).
281. See Kemp, supra note 103, at 23.
282. 173 F.3d at 102; sec also Kemp, supra note 103, at 23.
283. For a refresher on non-union vesting cases, see Subsection ll(B)(2), supra. Abbruscato
and Devlin (whose cases are often referred to by the second-named plaintiff, Kunkel, to distinguish
them from Dcilin i. Transport Communications International Union) were both plaintiffs against
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield.
284. Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2001).
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appellants to accept the offer to retire in order to avoid having to take these less
desirable steps.
211
The Second Circuit's experience shows that the extraordinary circumstances
element has a high threshold and probably requires improper inducements
proffered by an employer to prospective retirees. Even these cases, moreover,
merely allowed estoppel claims to survive motions for summary judgment.
To summarize, estoppel claims in retiree benefits cases are exceedingly
difficult to substantiate because of the significant evidentiary requirements. To
win, retirees must prove that 1) an employer intentionally deceived retirees in
making misstatements about their benefits, 2) the plan documents were
sufficiently vague or ambiguous to cause reliance on inconsistent oral statements,
and 3) extraordinary circumstances were present. And because estoppel claims
are the last legal claim that is routinely alleged in retiree benefits cases, it appears
that current law provides little recourse to retirees whose post-employment health
benefits have been substantially reduced or terminated.
E. Summary
To recapitulate briefly, ERISA generally allows employers to change retiree
health benefit plans at any time. Retirees have the burden of proving that their
former employer intended their benefits to "vest," thereby making them
unalterable, and plan documents are given great deference in establishing the
"vested" status of the benefits in question. Where plan documents are ambiguous,
different circuit courts apply different inferences, at least in a unionized context.
The majority of those courts, however, find that retiree health benefits do not vest
unless there is specific language in the plan documents to that effect, which is
rarely the case.
In a non-unionized context, no circuit court infers vesting. Rather, vesting
must be stated in unambiguous plan document language. But a generalized
reservation by an employer of the right to change a plan's terms is usually
sufficient to defeat claims by retirees that their benefits have vested. As a
consequence, what are labeled "lifetime" retiree health benefits are more
accurately described as lasting only as long as the former employer chooses to
provide them.
Retirees' claims that employers have been less than truthful have proven
difficult to sustain as breaches of the employers' fiduciary duty to their
employees. To win such claims, retirees must clear two separate hurdles: first,
that the former employer's representatives made material misrepresentations; and
second, that the former employer either knew of those misrepresentations, or
should have known about them, depending upon which judicial circuit the case
285. Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 90. 101-02 (2d Cir. 2001).
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involves.
Finally, retirees have tried to claim that they relied to their detriment on an
employer's false assurances of future health benefits. But courts have held that
presentations to prospective retirees need not mention an employer's right to
change benefits, as long as the plan documents themselves contain such
references. Small wonder, then, that even retirees who feel genuinely deceived
are unable to prove the elements that estoppel claims demand.
III. POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR RETIREES WHO HAVE LOST HEALTH BENEFITS
For retirees who have lost most or all of their post-employment health
benefits, the available options depend entirely on whether the retiree in question
is eligible for Medicare, which generally requires that the retiree be at least sixty-five years old. 286 The Medicare-eligible retiree is entitled to Medicare Part A
coverage of most hospital expenditures, 287 some nursing home288 and home
health care expenses, 289 and the cost of hospice care. In addition, Medicare-
eligible retirees have available the full panoply of health insurance alternatives
that retirees who never had employer-provided post-employment health benefits
can access. These alternatives include the following:
1) Medicare Part B, which covers physicians' fees, ambulance charges,
and most outpatient medical tests and procedures;
291
2) Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit plans;-2 2
3) Private supplemental insurance, generally known as "Medigap"
insurance, which covers most of the deductibles and co-payment
obligations under Medicare's hospital and physician coverages;293
4) Medicare Part C managed care plans that incorporate many. if not
most, of the benefits under Medicare Parts B and D, plus Medigap
insurance. 294
286.42 U.S.C § 1395c(l) (2000).
287. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 66-68.
288. See id. at 68-71.
289. See id. at 71-73.
290. See id. at 73-75.
291. See generally id. at 75-78 (explaining Medicare Part B coverage).
292. See generally id. at 85-91 (explaining Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit plans).
293. See generally id. at 95-103 (explaining private Medigap insurance coverage and options).
294. See generally id. at 103-07 (explaining Medicare managed care plans).
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To be sure, these alternatives may be quite difficult to sort out. The
Medicare Part D prescription drug plans, in particular, vary considerably from
state to state and change annually in terms of medications, dosage amounts, and
dosage frequencies covered-an unnecessarily baffling array of options that far
surpass all other pharmaceutical arrangements in terms of their complexity.
295
Similarly, Part C managed care plans provide comprehensive coverage but
generally limit access to specific doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, and drugs, or
allow wider access to health care providers but on less attractive financial
terms.296
In many cases, the cost of these various alternatives is likely to exceed what
the Medicare-eligible retirees would have paid under their former employers'
retiree health benefit plans. For example, Medicare Part B costs $96.40 per
month in 2009,297 and this amount is adjusted annually. 298 Upper-income retirees,
in fact, pay higher amounts depending upon the level of their income as
computed for federal income tax purposes.2 99 Monthly premiums for Medicare
Part D plans vary widely depending upon the scope of their covered
pharmaceutical formulary and their own set of deductibles and co-payment
300
obligations for generic and name-brand medications. Medigap policies are
standardized into twelve different benefit packages, and premiums vary by state
301but are generally higher for more comprehensive benefit arrangements.
Finally, Medicare managed care plans, currently dubbed "Medicare
Advantage, 30 2 exhibit considerable price variation depending upon their
295. See Richard L. Kaplan, The Medicare Drug Benefit: A Prescription for Confusion, 1
NAT'L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT'YS J. 167, 186 (2005); Medicare, Prescription Drug Coverage,
http://www.medicare.gov/pdphomc.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2009); see also Jane Zhang, Expect
Changes In Drug Co-Pays For Medicare, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2008, at DI (describing the most
recent batch of annual changes in prescription drug plans confronting Medicare enrollees).
296. See 2007 MEDICARE HANDBOOK 7-1 to -50 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr. eds.,
2007).
297. See Medicare Part B Monthly Premiums in 2009, http://questions.medicare.gov/cgibin/
medicare.cfg/php/enduser/popup-adp.phpp-sid=undefined&p- lxa=undefined&p-li=undefined&
p-faqid=2099&p-created = 1221840031&p _sp=undefined (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
298. 42 U.S.C. § 1395r(a) (2000).
299. See generallv Richard L. Kaplan, Means-Testing Medicare: Retiree Pain for Little
Governmental Gain, J. RETIREMENT PLAN., May-June 2006, at 22. In 2009, premiums are higher for
married couples with more than $170,000 of income. Medicare Part B Monthly Premiums in 2009,
supra note 297.
300. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE & You 2009, at 55-56 (2008),
available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf
301. See generallv CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2009 CHOOSING A MEDIGAP
POLICY: A GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE (2008), available at
http://www.medicare.gov/Publications Pubs/pdf/02110.pdf.
302. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-21 (West 2009).
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restrictiveness in terms of access to providers and the nature of any additional
services that they might include, such as wellness classes and vision care.
These choices may well be much more perplexing and complicated than the
employer-provided retiree health benefit packages that Medicare-eligible retirees
previously had, but at least these choices are available. The optional components
of Medicare-Part B, managed care plans under Part C, and prescription drug
plans under Part D-are all available without regard to a prospective enrollee's
medical profile. Even Medigap insurance, a private product, cannot be denied for
pre-existing medical conditions if an applicant applies for coverage prior to or
during the first six months of his or her enrollment in Medicare Part B. 3 Having
to navigate this unholy mess certainly adds to the anxiety and confusion that
these retirees face, but they are no worse off than Medicare-eligible retirees who
never had any retiree health benefits from a former employer.
Pre-Medicare retirees, by contrast, are distinctly worse off, and it is to their
situation that this section now turns. Their situation is especially problematic
given the high range of medical expenditures that this group incurs. The Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services found that people aged fifty-five to sixty-
four years spent an average of nearly $7800 per person on health care spending in
2004, 3o4 the most recent year for which data are available. Moreover, this
figure-as high at it is-masks the uneven distribution of health care costs across
this age cohort. A study using 2002 figures found that among persons aged fifty-
five to sixty-four years, nearly half of the entire group's health care costs were
incurred by the 7% of this group with the highest medical expenses. 305 Clearly,
pre-Medicare retirees have a particular need for health insurance. In this section,
we first examine currently available options, and then we analyze a proposal to
expand Medicare to younger retirees.
A. Current Options for Pre-Medicare Retirees
Retirees who are not yet eligible for Medicare have several options
depending on their individual circumstances. One such option is health insurance
through a working spouse. This option requires that 1) the retiree is currently
married, 2) the retiree's spouse is employed, 3) the spouse's employer offers
health insurance to its employees and their dependents, 4) the spouse is eligible
for this insurance according to the employer's criteria of hours worked and length
303. Id. § 1395ss(s)(2)(A) (2000).
304. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Total Personal Health Care Per Capita Spending,
By Age Group, Calendar Years, 1987, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, at 2, http://wwwA.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/2004-age-tables.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
305. See JOHN HOLAHAN, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HEALTH
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of employment, 306 and 5) the premiums associated with adding the retiree as a
spouse fit within the couple's budget. Only if all five of these requirements are
met is this alternative feasible.3 °7
A second option is obtaining Medicare as a disabled person prior to reaching
age sixty-five. 301 Someone who receives Social Security disability payments for
twenty-four months is eligible for Medicare, regardless of age.30 9 Qualifying for
such benefits, however, is not easy. The putative disabled person must be unable
to perform "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment., 310 The process of meeting this
standard involves various medical examinations and vocational tests to assess an
individual's possible employability. 311  Moreover, an inability to perform
"substantial gainful activity" must be expected to last at least one year or result in
the death of that person.31 2 In addition, the person's status as "disabled" is
reviewed periodically until he or she reaches Social Security's full "retirement
age. ''3 13 The qualification process is beset with delays, uncertainty, and
successive layers of administrative appeals.314 In any case, the "successful"
applicant must still cover his or her own medical costs during the requisite
twenty-four month period before Medicare eligibility is established.315
306. See JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK § 43.09[1] (3d ed. 1992).
307. Among persons aged fifty-five to sixty-four years, active employees as well as retirees,
approximately 18% receive health insurance through their spouse. This estimate was derived by
authors from CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 69 (2008), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf; see also Richard W. Johnson, When Should
Medicare Coverage Begin?, NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., Dec. 2003, at 2, available at
http://www.nasi.org/usr-doc/nasiBriefrisk6_03.pdf (presenting a comparable estimate of 16%
using 1998 data).
308. Among persons aged fifty-five to sixty-four years, active employees and retirees, 9.5%
are enrolled in Medicare. DENAVAS-WALT, PROCTOR & SMITH, supra note 307, at 69.
309. 42 U.S.C. §§ 426(b)(2)(A)(i), 1395c(2) (2000).
310. Id. § 416(i)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A person is presumed to be disabled if he or she
earns less than an annually adjusted amount, which in 2009 was $980 per month. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1574 (2008); Social Security Online, Automatic Increases in Recent Years, http://www.ssa.g
ov/ OACT/COLA~autoAdj.html (last accessed Mar. 31, 2009).
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), (B), (f). See generally CHARLES T. HALL, SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY PRACTICE (2007); 1-3 BARBARA SAMUELS, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (2d ed.
1994).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A) (2000).
313. Id. § 416(i)(2)(D). A person's full "retirement age" under Social Security is determined
by that person's year of birth. See id. § 416(l)(1).
314. See 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520 (2008). See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 323-
25 (describing appeals procedures).
315. There is no waiting period for individuals with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. 42 U.S.C. §
426(h) (2000).
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Three more generally applicable options for retirees who are not yet eligible
for Medicare include the following: 1) continue their former employer's health
insurance under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(COBRA), 31 6 2) purchase health insurance in the individual market, or 3) utilize
a health savings account after retirement. As this section will show, none of these
three options adequately addresses the problem of early retirees who have lost
their employer-sponsored retiree health benefits.
1. Continuation Coverage
COBRA allows former employees, including early retirees, 317 to continue
the health insurance they had through their former employer for up to eighteen
months after termination of employment. 318 Many early retirees, of course, face a
gap of much more than eighteen months between the date of their retirement and
their sixty-fifth birthday. 319 This time period is extended until a retiree's death if
that retiree's former employer terminates its health insurance coverage through a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy organization. 320 There is no such extension for a Chapter
7 bankruptcy liquidation, however.
In any case, COBRA insurance is not always affordable. Retirees must pay
the entire cost of this insurance without the employer subsidy that they typically
received when they were actively employed.321 As a result, the monthly cost for a
former employee might be as much as five times the cost that a current employee
would pay.322 Such a cost increase is especially difficult for a person who is not
currently employed.323 Perhaps it is not terribly surprising, then, that the most
316. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 10002(a), 100 Stat. 82, 227-31 (1986) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
1161-1168).
317. See 29 U.S.C. § 1167(2) (2000); MAMORSKY,supra note 306, § 36.05[2][d].
318.29 U.S.C. §§ 1161(a), 1162(1), 1162(2)(A)(i), 1163(2) (2000). The COBRA period is 36
months for the spouse of a current employee who becomes entitled to Medicare. Id. §§
1162(2)(A)(iv), 1163(4).
319. See 42 U.S.C. § 426(a)(1) (2000).
320. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1162(2)(A)(iii), 1163(6) (2000): see also JEFFREY D. MAAIORSKY. HEALTH
CARE BENEFITS LAW § 7.03[6] (2008).
321. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1162(3)(A), 1164(1) (2000): sec also Employee Benefits Security
Administration, FAQs About COBRA Continuation Health Coverage, available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-consumer-cobra.html. Recent national data on the cost of
employer-provided health insurance appear in BETH LEVIN CRIMMEL & JOHN P. SOI\IERS,
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCI FOR LARGE EMPLOYI-RS IN THE PRIVXTE SECTOR, BY
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION, 2006 (Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, Statistical Brief No. 211,
2008), available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data files publications/st2 11 /stat211 .pdf.
322. FIDELITY WORKPLACE SERVS., RETIREE HEALTH CARE COSTS: ADDRESSING THE GROWING
GAP 17 (2002).
323. See generally FAMILIES USA, SQUEEZED! CAUGHT BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
IX:2 (2009)
50
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol9/iss2/1
RETIREES AT RISK
recent study of this program found that only 9% of individuals eligible for
324COBRA continuation coverage actually obtain such insurance. On the other
hand, at least this insurance is available without medical underwriting.
These twin problems of COBRA-namely, a limited coverage period and
high premium costs-were both addressed in the very beginning of President
Barack Obama's administration. His signature economic stimulus legislation,
appropriately designated as House Bill 1,325 provided that persons who lost their
employer-provided health insurance after attaining age fifty-five could extend
their COBRA coverage until they reached the Medicare eligibility age of sixty-
five years.326 This Bill also provided that the cost of this coverage would be
subsidized by the federal government to the extent of 65%, with the individual
retiree being responsible for the remaining 35 %.327 This COBRA provision
would apply, however, only to persons who were involuntarily terminated from
employment between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009. 3" s Although
this provision passed the House of Representatives, the Conference Committee
that produced the final version of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009329 further limited its applicability to workers who were within nine
months of becoming age-eligible for Medicare.33o
In any case, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996331 allows persons who previously had group health insurance coverage to
obtain individual coverage without being declined for medical reasons.332 But
this statute puts no limits on the price of such coverage. As the Government
Accounting Office concluded in a study of insurance policies issued under this
statute, these policies "may be cost prohibitive to many retirees.
333
AND HEALTH CARE COSTS (2009), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/cobra-2
009.pdf.
324. MICHELLE DOTY ET AL., MAINTAINING HEALTH INSURANCE DURING A RECESSION: LIKELY
COBRA ELIGIBILITY 3 (Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief 3, 2009), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr doc/Doty-maintaininghltinsrecess
ionCOBRA_1225_ib.pd?section=4039.
325. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R.1, 111 th Cong. (engrossed as
agreed to or passed by the House of Representatives, Jan. 28, 2009).
326. Id. § 3002(b)(1)-(3).
327. Id. § 3002(a)(1).
328. Id. § 3002(a)(3)(A), (C).
329. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
330. See id. § 3001(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii)(I).
331. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
332. I.R.C. § 9802(a)(1) (2008); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (2000). States have the option of
establishing high risk pools. Sec generally MAMORSKY, supra note 320, § 16.04.
333. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
BENEFITS MAY BE VULNERABLE TO FURTHER EROSION 19 (2001). available at
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2. Individual Insurance Market
Retirees who try to purchase health insurance in the individual insurance
market face a major obstacle: medical underwriting. 334 Unless state laws require
insurance companies to accept all applicants (so-called "guaranteed issue"), 335
private insurers are free to accept or reject whomever they choose. Some states
require that insurers apply the same rates to all accepted applicants (so-called
"community rating"), 336 but most states allow insurers to price accepted
applicants differentially. As a result, a pre-Medicare retiree may be unable to
obtain any health insurance in the individual market, much less quality coverage,
or to afford whatever health insurance that he or she can obtain. 337 This situation
is radically different from the pre-retirement context where the person was part of
an employer-based group that included younger and presumably healthier co-
workers who effectively subsidized their older colleagues. 
338
To put the matter in the bluntest terms, many people simply take their
employer-provided health insurance for granted until they try to replace it outside
the workplace environment. For example, a 2004 study published by the Kaiser
Family Foundation found that middle-income persons aged fifty-five to sixty-
four years who claimed to be in "good" health were twice as likely to have no
health insurance as those whose self-reported health status was "excellent" or
"very good.-1 39 It is often the case that retirees in this age group have developed
some medical history that diminishes their prospects of securing health
insurance.340
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO 1 374.pdf.
334. See Sarah Rubenstein, Health Insurers Often Reject 'Near Elderly,' WALL ST. J., Nov.
16, 2004, at BI; see also COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, REACHING THE UNINSU*RED: ALTER\ATI'E
APPROACHES TO EXPANDING HEALTH INSURANCE ACCESS 2-3 (2000).
335. See COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., 2007 STATE LEGISLATORS GUIDE TO HEALTH
INSURANCE SOLUTIONS AND GLOSSARY 18-19 (2007), available at http:/ wwxw.cahi.org/
cahi_contents/resources/pdf/2007State]eg.pdf.
336. See id. at 11-12.
337. As to the difficulties affecting the individual insurance market generally, including
misleading advertising, high rejection rates that rise with an applicant's age, and high nonrenewal
rates for those who incur covered expenses, see FAMILIES USA, EMPTY PROMISE: SEARCHING FOR
HEALTH INSURANCE IN AN UNFAIR MARKET (2008), available at http: ,w\w.familiesusa.org/
assets/pdfs/play-fair-empty-promise- I .pdf.
338. Scc Paul B. Grant, Commentar,, in PROVIDING HEALTH CARE, supra note 29, at 93, 95
(noting that the cost of insuring a sixty-year-old employee may be as much as four times the cost of
insuring a twenty-five-year-old); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers.for Employment-
Based Health Insurance, 2 YALEJ. HEALTH POL' L. & ETHICS 23, 31-33 (2001).
339. HOLAHAN, supra note 305, at 16-17.
340. See Chad Terhume, Emplovers Turn to Alternative For Insuring Staff, WALL ST. J., July
30, 2007, at Al (noting that "about a quarter of people 55 to 64 get rejected for individual
IX:2 (2009)
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To be sure, thirty-four states operate some sort of high-risk insurance pool,
but sixteen states have none.34' Moreover, the high-risk insurance pools that do
exist often place limits on their coverage of pre-existing conditions, impose
waiting periods on such coverage, or exclude these conditions from coverage
entirely. Even with these limitations, these policies may be unaffordable.343
AARP, the older persons advocacy group, has tried to respond to this
problem by offering health insurance specifically to persons aged fifty to sixty-
four years. 344 This plan intentionally has more lenient underwriting criteria; for
example, it looks back only five years when someone applies for coverage in
considering pre-existing medical conditions.345 Nevertheless, it rejects some
applicants and raises prices for others.346 But the point remains that the
individual insurance market is fraught with uncertainty,347 a prospect that is
especially troubling for early retirees as they enter a phase in their lives when
increased health care utilization is more likely than not.
3. Health Savings Accounts
A third alternative utilizes the health savings account (HSA) mechanism that
Congress first created in 2003.348 These accounts are combined with a high-
deductible insurance policy that covers the cost of accidents and extended
illness. 349 The central idea is that early retirees may save pre-tax dollars in an
HSA and then use funds in that account to cover health care costs that are not
covered by the associated insurance policy.3 Among the categories of
coverage"); see also FAMILIES USA, supra note 323, at 3 (nothing that "those with health problems
are likely to find that no insurer will sell them a policy that will cover their pre-existing conditions
at any price").
341. Terhume, supra note 340.
342. See AMANDA MCCLOSKEY & RACHEL KLEIN, FAMILIES USA, Too FEW OPTIONS: THE
INSURANCE STATUS OF WIDOWED OR DIVORCED OLDER WOMEN 17 (2001), available at
http://www.communityvoices.org/Uploads/om3gfk55hhzyvrnOOn4 nerbf 20020828085202.pdf.
343. Id.; see also Catherine Chou, Insuring M edically Uninsurable Individuals: An
Examination of Difjterent State Approaches, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 443, 448-49 (2006).
344. AARP, AARP Health Products & Services, http://www.aarphealthcare.com/products/
default.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
345. See Rubenstein, supra note 334.
346. See id.
347. See Rappaport & Malone, supra note 47, at 86 ("Virtually no market exists for individual
coverage for retirees not yet eligible for Medicare.").
348. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, § 1201(a), 117 Stat. 2066, 2469 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 223). See generally
Kaplan, supra note 37.
349. I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(A)(i) (2008).
350. Kaplan, supra note 37, at 549.
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"qualified medical expenses" that can be paid with tax-free withdrawals from an
HSA3 5' are premiums on COBRA continuation insurance policies, 52 as well as
premiums on Medicare Part B coverage3 53 once the retiree becomes eligible for
that program.
To qualify, the early retiree must have a health insurance policy that meets
the definition of "high-deductible. 3 54 Such a policy must have an annual
deductible before coverage starts of at least $1150 for self-only coverage or
$2300 for family coverage. 55 These limits pertain to calendar year 2009 and are
adjusted annually for inflation. 5 6 Certain medical expenses may be covered by a
"high-deductible" policy before the annual deductible is satisfied, but those
expenses relate to "preventive care,, 3 57 a category that generally includes
periodic medical examinations, diagnostic procedures, and various screening
tests.3 58 Pharmaceuticals may not, however, be covered until the policy's
deductible has been met. Accordingly, a qualifying "high-deductible" insurance
policy can expose the typical early retiree to considerable out-of-pocket medical
expenses.
In any case, there is no guarantee that an early retiree will be able to obtain
the "high-deductible" insurance policy that an HSA requires. Such policies are
subject to the same medical underwriting limitations, including possible
unavailability due to an applicant's pre-existing conditions, that characterize the
individual insurance market generally. Consequently, the HSA alternative is less
promising than it might appear due to the necessity of securing a "high-
deductible" insurance policy.
But if an early retiree manages to secure such a policy, the appeal of the
HSA alternative then depends principally upon two independent factors: one,
how much is put into the account; and two, how much is withdrawn.3 59 The
owner of an HSA can make pre-tax contributions of an annually adjusted
amount.3 60 In 2009, the maximum annual contribution is S3000 for self-only
coverage and $5950 for family coverage. 361 Persons who are at least fifty-five
years old, moreover, are allowed to make additional "catch up" contributions of
351. I.R.C. § 223(d)(2), (f)(1).
352. Id. § 223(d)(2)(C)(i).
353. Id. § 223(d)(2)(C)(iv).
354. See id. § 223(c)(2).
355. Rev. Proc. 2008-29 § 2, 2008-22 I.R.B. 1039.
356. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(i), (g)(1) (2008).
357. Id. § 223(c)(2)(C).
358. I.R.S. Notice 2004-23, 2004-1 C.B. 725.
359. Of less consequence is the investment return earned by the funds in the HSA.
360. See I.R.C. § 223(a) (2008).
361. Rev. Proc. 2008-29 § 2, 2008-22 I.R.B. 1039.
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362 363$1000 per year in 2009.362 Funds in an HSA accumulate free of income tax,
and any balance that is unspent at year's end simply rolls forward.364 Thus, the
optimum strategy is to contribute the maximum amount allowable each year and
to minimize withdrawals from the HSA. 365 In other words, even permissible
withdrawals for "qualified medical expenses" should be kept to a minimum to
preserve the funds accumulated in the HSA. Suffice it to say, few early retirees
are able to meet both of these conditions without suffering some degree of
financial hardship.
Even if an early retiree obtains a qualifying "high-deductible" health
insurance policy, funds the associated HSA at the maximum levels allowed, and
minimizes withdrawals, what might result? The answer depends on the rate of
return that the HSA's investments yield, the extent to which those withdrawals
are minimized, and the number of years during which this arrangement is
maintained. A simulation prepared by the Employee Benefit Research Institute
assumed a 5% annual rate of return and maximum annual contributions,
including "catch up" contributions.366 According to their results, as modified for
current contribution levels, a fifty-five-year-old retiree with self-only coverage
would have the following balances in his or her HSA after ten years (i.e., at age
sixty-five), 367 depending upon the percentage of year-end account balance that is
left untouched:






362. I.R.C. § 223(b)(3)(B) (2008).
363. Id. § 223(e)(1).
364. See Sarah Lueck, Medicare Law Reaches the Under-65 Set, Too, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16,
2003, at D1.
365. See Sarah Rubenstein, How to Manage a Health Savings Account To Cover Your Medical
Bills in Retirement, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2006, at D 1.
366. FRONSTIN, Issue Brief No. 295, supra note 12, at 17.
367. A retiree who is entitled to Medicare benefits may not contribute to an HSA. I.R.C. §
223(b)(7) (2008).
368. Adapted by authors from FRONSTIN, Issue Brief No. 295, supra note 12, at 17, and Paul
Fronstin, Savings for Health Care Expenses in Retirement: The Use of Health Savings Accounts,
EBRI NOTES, August 2008, at 12, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRINotes_08b-
20081.pdf. Maximum contributions to HSAs (excluding catch up contributions) are assumed to
increase at a 2.8% annual rate of inflation. See Bd. of Trs. of the Fed. Hosp. Ins. & Fed.
Supplementary Med. Ins. Trust Funds. 2008 Annual Report at 7, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reportstrustfunds'downloads/tr2008.pdf.
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Thus, even in the most optimistic scenario-the 100% rollover, with no
withdrawals-the HSA would accumulate only $54,966 after ten years of
maximum contributions. Moreover, the extent to which HSA funds are utilized
for "qualified medical expenses" during the ten-year period makes a huge
difference in the final result. As the results above show, the difference between
the 50% and 100% rollover situation is not merely twice as much available at the
end of the period, but 5.25 times as much. 369 Furthermore, the possibility of
maximizing HSA balance by contributing at maximum levels at a younger age
than fifty-five is precluded by the fact that most people would not be eligible for
an HSA while employed because their employer-provided health insurance is
more comprehensive than a "high deductible" policy. Accordingly, the
alternative of a "high deductible" insurance policy coupled with an HSA has
limited potential for addressing an early retiree's health care costs in most
circumstances. 370
To summarize, continuation coverage under COBRA is limited to eighteen
months and can be very expensive. It is available, however, to early retirees
without the need to satisfy medical underwriting criteria. Such criteria can be a
large, and often insurmountable, barrier for early retirees who seek health
insurance in the individual policy market. Even retirees who are able to secure
such insurance, moreover, may find that they must accept high-deductible
policies to keep the premiums affordable. Given that reality, some early retirees
may want to establish an HSA to cover out-of-pocket medical expenses. But such
an account is unlikely to generate significant funds except under rather trying
conditions of limited withdrawals. In short, the existing options for pre-Medicare
retirees who have lost their employer-provided post-employment health benefits
are less than appealing.
371
B. Extending Medicare to Early Retirees
In light of the above discussion, this Section considers the alternative
approach of simply extending Medicare coverage to early retirees. Persons under
age sixty-five are already eligible if they have received disability payments under
369. $54,966 . $10,473 = 5.25.
370. See George Wagoner et al., Risk-Sharing in Retiree Xedical Benefits, in RESTRUCTURING
RETIREMENT RISKS 136, 154, 156 (David Blitzstein, Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds.,
2006) (using a simulation to show the inadequacy of HSAs to meet most estimates of projected
health care costs in retirement).
371. See EDWIN PARK & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, NEW
RETIREMENT MEDICAL AccOUNT PROPOSAL WOULD CREATE LUCRATIVE TAX SHELTER AND SWELL
DEFICITS, BUT Do LITTLE TO HI LP LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME SENIORS (2004),
http://www.cbpp.org/4-19-04health.pdf (discussing a retiree medical benefit account proposal that
was never introduced as legislation).
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the Social Security program for twenty-four months.3 72 The policy question,
therefore, is whether retirees who are not disabled should be allowed to join the
Medicare program prior to reaching age sixty-five.
In point of fact, President Bill Clinton actually made such a proposal more
than a decade ago. 373 On January 6, 1998, he put forward a budget-neutral plan
for retirees who were at least sixty-two years old to buy into Medicare at an
actuarially full cost. 3 7 4 And retirees who were at least fifty-five years old would,
under this proposal, be able to extend their COBRA coverage until they were
eligible for Medicare.
37 5
President Clinton's proposal did not, however, receive much serious
attention. Within two weeks of introducing this proposal, the Monica Lcwinsky
scandal broke,37 6 and official Washington became obsessed with the political
ramifications of that matter. The idea of extending Medicare has remained salient
nevertheless, and some version of President Clinton's proposal has been
introduced in every subsequent Congress. 377 The latest iteration is Senate Bill
3710, the Medicare Early Access Act of 2008.378 Proposed by such prominent
Senators as Jay Rockefeller and John Kerry, among others, this Bill provides that
individuals who are at least fifty-five years old may enroll in Medicare if they are
not eligible for Medicaid, the federal employees' health benefit program,
TRICARE, active duty military health care, or any other group health plan.
3 79
For this purpose, eligibility for a group health plan through a COBRA
continuation provision would be disregarded.
380
1. Eligibility Criteria
To qualify for this proposed "early access" Medicare, an individual would
372. 42 U.S.C. § 426(b) (2000).
373. See Press Release, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., President Clinton Announces New\
Proposal to Provide Americans Age 55 to 65 Improved Access to Health Insurance (Jan. 6, 1998),
available at http:i/ww.hhs.gov/news/press' I 998pres/ 980106.html.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. See James Bennet, Defending Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al.
377. See S. 3747, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 2072, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 5218, 108th
Cong. (2004); H.R. 4357, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 1935, 108th Cong. (2003): H.R. 3189, 108th
Cong. (2003); S. 2679, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4684, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 623, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 1255, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 803, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2918, 106th Cong.
(2000); H.R. 4938, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 3529, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 2228, 106th Cong.
(1999); S. 202, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 10, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 4799, 105th Cong. (1998); S.
1789, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3470, 105th Cong. (1998).
378. S. 3710, 11 0th Cong. (2008).
379. Id. § 101(a)(2).
380. Id.
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otherwise need to be be eligible for Medicare benefits. 381 This criterion would
require a person to be eligible for retirement benefits under the federal
government's Social Security program. 382 In general terms, such a person must
have earned at least forty "quarters of coverage" in employment that was subject
to the Social Security payroll tax.383 Most employment in the United States so
qualifies, but there are some exceptions, including employment in most state and
local government service and student employment at the college or university in
which a student is enrolled.384 A person earns a "quarter of coverage" by earning
385a stipulated amount that is adjusted annually for inflation. Work in 2009
required earnings of $1090 to count as a "quarter of coverage. 386 Alternatively,
a person can qualify for Medicare if his or her spouse meets the work
requirement,387 and a divorced spouse of an eligible worker can qualify as long
388as their marriage lasted at least ten years.
In any case, the proposed legislation would require an enrollee to remain in
the program. 389 That is, a person who enrolled in "early access" Medicare and
then terminated his or her enrollment (except upon reaching age sixty-five) could
not subsequently re-enroll in the program. 390 An exception would be made,
however, for someone who enrolled in a group health plan or other federal health
insurance program and then lost eligibility for that program.39' But potential
enrollees would not be required to exhaust their rights to COBRA continuation
coverage before accessing Medicare early. 392
2. Financing Aspects
Early access Medicare would not be cost-free by any means, but it would be
available to all eligible applicants without regard to their medical history or
current health profile. As noted previously, that feature would be a major benefit
of this program. Enrollees would be assessed a premium that was calculated in an
381. Id.
382. 42 U.S.C. §§ 426(a)(2)(A), 1395c (2000).
383. Id. § 414(a)(2) (2000).
384. See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 285-87 (explaining the scope of
covered employment under Social Security).
385. 42 U.S.C. § 413(d)(2) (2000).
386. Social Security Online, Automatic Increases in Recent Years, http:,,wxww.ssa.gov/
OACT/COLA/autoAdj.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
387.42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1), (c)(1) (2000).
388. Id.; id. § 416(d)(1) (2000).
389. S. 3710, 1 10th Cong. § 101(a)(2) (2008) (at Sec. 1860E-1(b)(2)).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. (at Sec. 1860E- 1 (b)(2)(B)).
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effort to make the early access program self-sustaining.393 This program would
have its own "trust fund" 394 to ensure that the financial condition of the existing
Medicare program would not be affected by the introduction of early access
Medicare. The U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services would calculate the
national "average annual per capita amount," 395 and enrollees would be
responsible for 25% of this cost. 396 The proposed legislation would allow persons
with existing employer-provided retiree health benefits to choose early access
Medicare instead of those benefits 397 and suggests-but does not require-that
the former employer in such circumstances might pay the enrollee's 25% cost
obligation.398
To ensure that this program will be affordable to the broadest swath of
potential enrollees, the remaining 75% of the cost would come from a federal
income tax credit.3 99 This tax credit would be "refundable, 40 0 so that enrollees
with limited or no income tax liability would nevertheless benefit from it.
Moreover, this tax credit would be in the form of an "advance payment, 4 °1
meaning that an enrollee would not be required to wait until after he or she files a
tax return to receive the financial benefit from the credit. This rather convoluted
financing mechanism results in the early access Medicare program's cost being
borne 25% by the enrollee (or possibly the enrollee's former employer) and 75%
by general tax revenues of the federal government. This 25-75 ratio, by the way,
is the same cost allocation that applies generally to persons who enroll in
Medicare Part B402 to get coverage of doctors' fees, diagnostic tests, and other
outpatient services. To reduce the financial impact on the federal government, the
means-testing mechanism that currently applies to Medicare Part B could be
applied to this program as well. 0 3 It should be noted, however, that none of the
early access Medicare proposals that have been put forward contain this
particular feature.
Without the 75% subsidy, an early access program would impose no
393. See id. (at Sec. 1860E-3(b)(1)).
394. Id. (at Sec. 1860E-4(a)(1)); id. (at Sec. 1860E-6).
395. Id. (at Sec. 1860E-4(b)(1 )).
396. Id. (at Sec. 1860E-5(b)(2)).
397. Id. (at Sec. 1860E-5(a)).
398. Id. (at Sec. 1860E-5(b)).
399. Id. § 201(a) (at Sec. 36A(a)).
400. Id. § 201(a).
401. Id. § 201(b).
402. 2009 MEDICARE HAN DBOOK § 6.02[C][1], at 6-10 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr.
eds., 2009).
403. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395r(i) (West Supp. 2008) (describing the means testing of Part B).
See general/y FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 60-61 (explaining the surcharge for Medicare
Part B imposed on higher-income enrollees). For an analysis of the implementation problems
involved in means-testing Medicare, see Kaplan, supra note 299, at 22.
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significant costs on the federal government. Although none of the legislative
proposals made since President Clinton's 1998 announcement has been the focus
of a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost study, the CBO very recently
issued a "budget options" report 4 ° 4 that included a variant of early access
Medicare among its 115 health care proposals. 40 5 The option discussed in this
Report would cover only persons age sixty-two through sixty-four,40 6 rather than
the larger group that the legislative proposals considered above would cover-
namely, persons age fifty-five to sixty-four. The CBO report stated that if the
government would "set a premium that would cover the costs of the program's
participants during the buy-in years ... the program would not require any new
outlays.,
40 7
The CBO report contends that an early buy-in option for Medicare would be
very expensive, because it would induce additional Social Security beneficiaries
to file for early retirement benefits under that program.40 8 But early retirement
benefits under Social Security are actuarially reduced so that over the lifetime of
early-claiming beneficiaries, the government's outlays for Social Security are
essentially equivalent. 40 9 That is, early claimants of Social Security retirement
benefits receive more money at younger ages than do beneficiaries who wait until
their "full retirement age" to start receiving benefits, 410 but they receive less
money after that point. Inducing early claimants under Social Security, therefore,
does not increase total lifetime government expenditures for the affected
beneficiaries. There will certainly be an increase in near-term government
outlays, which is what the CBO report highlighted, but that is strictly a timing
phenomenon and does not increase Social Security's overall expenditures. As the
CBO report itself acknowledges, "the effects on [Social Security] outlays should
be minimal, because earlier retirement results in lower annual benefits.,
411
If the government chooses to subsidize the early access Medicare program,
however, there will obviously be an increase in government expenditures.
Precisely how much that increase will be depends upon three distinct factors: 1)
the cost of the program per enrollee, 2) the number of persons who participate in
404. 1 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS (2008). available at http:/,xN-w.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/99xx/doc9925/12-18-HealthOptions.pdf [hereinafter CBO REPORT].
405. Id. at 1, 39-40.
406. Id. at 39.
407. Id. (emphasis added).
408. See id.
409. See C. EUGENE STI,.UERLF & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21 ST
C(1NIURY 221 (1994) ("The actuarial reduction for early retirement roughly offsets the extra
benefits one receives before age 65.").
410. See FROLIK & KAPILAN, supra note 8, at 289-91 (explaining the computation of "early"
Social Security retirement benefits).
411. CBO REPORT, supra note 404, at 39-40.
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the program, and 3) the degree of premium subsidization that the government
provides. On the first factor, the CBO estimated the annual premium cost as
$7600 for calendar year 201 1,41' but this amount includes a 5% "administrative
fee" that would be imposed in addition to the actual programmatic cost. 413 The
real projected cost, in other words, would be S7238 per participant,41 4 which
seems reasonable given the targeted age group's incidence of chronic medical
conditions.
415
Even this figure is somewhat inflated, however, because of three separate
factors. First, the program considered by the CBO would cover only persons over
age sixty-one, rather than the larger age cohort of fifty-five to sixty-four-year-
olds that the legislative proposals cover. Bringing the younger segment of this
age cohort-that is, persons aged fifty-five to sixty-one-into the program would
lower the per-person cost, because health care costs tend to rise as a person
ages. 4 16 Thus, the per-person cost of a program for fifty-five to sixty-four-year-
olds would be less expensive than the amount estimated by the CBO for a
program that applies only to sixty-two to sixty-four-year-olds.
Second, the program described by the CBO would be voluntary, so persons
anticipating higher expenditures would be more likely to enroll. As the CBO
report itself notes, "The premium for the buy-in program would be higher than if
the entire eligible population was enrolled because the program would be likely
to experience adverse selection ...., To be sure, any nonmandatory health
insurance program is subject to this phenomenon, including the legislative
proposals analyzed earlier, but it raises the per-person cost nonetheless.
Finally, the CBO did not consider the budgetary benefit of providing health
insurance to persons who would otherwise enroll in Medicare at age sixty-five,
but in worse health. The CBO report acknowledges that "improvements in health
status [of pre-Medicare enrollees] . . could reduce Medicare's spending for
those individuals after they turned 6 5 .' 4i8 Indeed, an important study in the New
England Journal of Medicine found that the cost of extending health insurance
coverage to pre-Medicare adults would be partially offset by reduced Medicare
expenditures when those persons later enrolled in that program, 419 especially for
412.Id. at 39.
413. Id.
414. Premium cost of $7600 . 1.05 = S7238.
415. See Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market, in IA HANDBOOK OF
HFAIH E(IoNOMIC S 645, 675 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (chart of
chronic conditions by age cohort).
416. Sec Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.. supra note 304, at 2.
417. CR0 REPORT, supra note 404, at 39 (emphasis added).
418. Id. at40.
419. J. Michael Williams et al., Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured Jtcdlcarc
Bene/iciaries, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 143, 151 (2007).
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persons with cardiovascular disease or diabetes. 420 On the other hand, the CBO
cautioned that "such improvements in health status might also reduce the number
of people who died before turning 65, which would increase outlays for
Medicare. 421
As for the number of people who would enroll in the program, the CBO
report estimated this number as 300,000, 4 2 2 assuming no premium subsidy would
be offered. But the number of enrollees will undoubtedly increase if younger-age
persons are eligible, and even more so if the government provides a substantial
premium subsidy, as the legislative proposals considered previously provide. The
degree of premium subsidy, in other words, is a budget variable that Congress
can use to adjust the scope of the program. That is, if the subsidy is low, either in
dollar terms or as a percentage of the premium cost, then fewer eligible retirees
are likely to participate. But if the subsidy is large, then more eligible retirees
will probably participate, thereby raising associated program costs.
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, what would a subsidized early access
Medicare program cost? Using the CBO's per-person estimate of $7600 (which
includes administrative expenses), a 75% subsidy translates into a governmental
cost of $5700 per enrollee. The most likely retirees who would enroll in this
program are those who are either uninsured presently or who have individually
issued health insurance policies. According to the most recent Census Bureau
data, the number of fifty-five to sixty-four-year-olds in these two categories is
7,248,000. 421 Multiplying the $5700 per-person cost by this population produces
a projected government outlay of over $41 billion.424
This estimate, however, is subject to several major caveats. It is undoubtedly
inflated because it is based on the CBO's per-person cost, which ignores the
lower per-person cost that would be obtained if retirees under age sixty-two were
included in the program. The estimate is also inflated because it ignores the
offsetting benefits of providing better access to health care for pre-Medicare
retirees. It is further inflated because it assumes that every retiree who is eligible
for the program will choose to enroll in it. But many low-income retirees will not
be able to afford the 25% portion of the premium cost that enrollees themselves
must pay. To the extent that there will be nonparticipating retirees, therefore, the
420. Id.; see also Jack Hadley & Timothy Waidmann, Health Insurance and Health at Age 65:
Implications for Medical Care Spending on New Medicare Beneficiaries, 41 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 429 (2006) (extending health coverage to persons aged fifty-five to sixty-four could offset
some of the cost of that coverage with improved health at age sixty-five).
421. CBO REPOR1, supra note 404, at 40.
422. Id.
423. Among fifty-five to sixty-four-year-olds, 4,011,000 had no health insurance and
3,237,000 had individual coverage in 2007. See DENAVAS-WALT, PROCTOR & SMITH, supra note
307, at 69.
424. $5700 x 7,248,000 - $41,313,600,000.
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early access program will cost less than the $41 billion estimate derived above.
On the other hand, the program's cost will exceed this estimate if employers
continue to abandon their existing retiree health benefit arrangements, thereby
increasing the number of early retirees without adequate health insurance.
Whatever the cost of this program may be, the question of whether the
government should extend the social safety net to pre-Medicare retirees is
ultimately a normative matter for the political process to resolve. As noted in Part
II of this Article, many early retirees believed for decades that their future health
care costs would be covered. They placed their faith in the promises of retiree
health benefits that their employers made as part of their compensation packages.
Had these retirees realized just how ephemeral those promises were, they might
have sought other employment or at least higher wages in lieu of retiree health
benefits. But now, it is too late for them to pursue those alternatives.
Perhaps the government should have warned prospective retirees to discount
employer assurances as meaningless inducements subject to cancellation at a
corporate whim, or at least subject to the unknowable vagaries of future
economic conditions. Alternatively, Congress could have provided more
effective tax incentives for employers to prefund retiree health benefits,4
complete with a government agency guarantee in case of employer
bankruptcy,426 akin to the elaborate structure created by ERISA to give pensions
the reliability they currently have. When that statute was enacted, the focus was
on pensions because they were already significant obligations. The unanticipated
increase in the value of retiree health benefits, however, makes these benefits
equally worthy of legal protection. But even if Congress acted along these lines
tomorrow, such an enactment would provide no benefit for the generation of
current and near-term prospective retirees whose health benefits have been
curtailed or eliminated outright.
Instead, the courts eviscerated retirees' reasonable expectations by focusing
on obscure clauses in impenetrable plan documents without regard to the retirees'
level of education, the length of those documents, or the content of employer-
provided "general" information. Only long after the fact have retirees learned that
employer promises of future health benefits are not what they seemed.
Throughout the course of the litigation analyzed previously in this Article,
Congress provided no relief-either prospective or remedial-to the innocent
victims of these employment benefit "interpretations." Having allowed this state
425. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EMPLOYER-SPONSORED RETIREE HEALTH INSURANCE: AN
ENDANGERED BENEFIT? 10 (2006) (on file with the Journal) ("The tax code in general does not
provide as favorable a tax treatment for prefunding of retiree health benefits as for pension
benefits."); EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS
268 (6th ed. 2009).
426. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 361 (explaining the function of the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the scope of its protection).
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of affairs to develop, it falls to the government to address these retirees' claims of
broken promises.
Extending access to Medicare would advance the original premise of the
program-namely, to provide health insurance when private insurers are
unwilling to do SO.427 Moreover, this extension accords with the sentiments of a
substantial majority of Americans regarding access to health care generally. A
September 2007 survey conducted by the Harris Poll organization posed the
following question: "To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with the
following statement . . . 'It is the government's duty to ensure that all Americans
have adequate healthcare coverage'?,, 42' Nearly two-thirds of the survey
respondents agreed with this statement, including almost half of all self-identified
Republicans. 429 Thus, expanding Medicare to cover "early" retirees would accord
with people's general conception of the proper role of government regarding
health care.
3. Possible Impact on Existing Retiree Health Benefit Plans
One extremely important caveat regarding a proposed extension of Medicare
to "early" retirees involves existing employer-provided retiree health plans-
namely, would the availability of such a government-subsidized program further
encourage employers to drop or substantially curtail their current retiree health
benefit arrangements? 430 If so, many of the affected retirees would actually be
worse off financially. For the most part, employer-provided retiree health benefit
plans are easier to understand, more comprehensive, and less expensive than the
current Medicare program with its separate components for physicians' fees.
prescription drugs, and Medigap coverage.431 Consequently, extending Medicare
availability to "early" retirees might be resisted by individuals who fear that their
427. See Marilyn Moon, Retiree Health Care. Individuals Picking Up Bigger Tab, TIAA-
CREF INST. TRENDS & ISSUES, July 2005, at 3, available at http:, wxv.tiaa-c
refinstitute.org/pdf/research/trends-issucs,'tr07OlO5.pdf; see also FINKEL & RtCHLIN. supra note
14, at 62 ("[H]ealth insurance for the elderly person was generally unavailable as a commercial
product before 1965.").
428. WSJ.com/Harris Interactive Survcy Finds That Senator Hillar" Clinton Most Trusted on
Healthcare Policy Lssues, but Trust is Declining, HtALTH CARE POLL, Oct. 4, 2007, at 5,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/wsjhealthne\s 'HIWSJ_HealthCarePoll_
2007 v06 i16.pdf.
429. Id. at 6.
430. See Rappaport & Malone, supra note 47, at 86 (stating that "it seems likely that many
employers would no longer sponsor rctircc health benefit coverage" if Medicare's eligibility age
were reduced).
431. Scc supra text accompanying notes 287-298; sec also Joi1\soN, supra note 19, at 4
(reporting that monthly premiums for Medigap coverage in 2004 were more than double the
median monthly retiree contribution in employer-sponsored retiree benefit plans).
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former employers will use this new development as an excuse to alter or abandon
their present retiree health benefit obligations.
This specific issue of Medicare substitution or "crowd out" was raised
during the extensive negotiations that took place when a prescription drug benefit
for Medicare was being considered in 2003. With employers eager to rid
themselves of retiree health benefit plans anyway, many retirees and
policymakers were extremely concerned that a new government-funded
alternative for prescription drugs would only make matters worse for persons
who currently had retiree health benefits.432 After all, the cost of prescription
medications accounts for almost two-thirds of the expense of a typical employer-
sponsored retiree health benefits plan.433 The political imperative, therefore, was
"first, do no harm," a requirement that almost derailed the Medicare prescription
drug bill's very enactment.434
In the end, Congress added an incentive in the form of a federal subsidy
equal to 28% of an employer's annual cost of providing prescription medications
of more than $295 and less than $6000 (in 2009) per person.435 In effect,
employers that offer qualifying drug coverage can receive an annual federal
436subsidy of as much as $1597 (in 2009) per covered retiree. This subsidy,
moreover, is free of federal income tax,437 and does not reduce the employer's
allowable federal income tax deduction for the cost of this expense. 438 That
deduction is equivalent to a further federal subsidy of as much as 35%,
depending upon the employer's tax bracket. 439 But even employers who face no
current federal income obligation-such as charitable organizations, state and
local governments, and profit-seeking enterprises with significant tax loss
carryforwards 440-can benefit from the 28% federal subsidy.
The critical question, of course, is whether this federal subsidy, perhaps
432. See Patricia Barry, Anxiety Zone: Will the New Medicare Law Encourage Employers To
Drop or Keep Their Retiree Drug Plans?, AARP BULLETIN, Feb. 2005, at 14; FRONST1N, supra note
22, at 8, 10; Frank B. McArdle et al., Large Firms' Retiree Health Benefits Before Medicare
Reform: 2003 Sunvei Results, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan. 2004, at w4-7 available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/webexclusives/index.dtl?year-2004.
433. See Schieber, supra note 55, at 10.
434. See Laurie McGinley et al., A Guide to Who Wins and Loses in Medicare Bill, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 18, 2003, at BI.
435. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-132(a)(3)(A). (B) (2000); Memorandum from Abby L. Block & Paul
Spitalnic to All Medicare Advantage Orgs., Prescription Drug Plan Sponsors, and Other Interested
Parties 33 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtg
SpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2009.pdf.
436. $6000 - $295 = $5705 x 28% = $1,597.40.
437. I.R.C. § 139A (2008).
438. Id. § 162(a)(1).
439. Id. § 1 l(b)(1) (specifying the corporate income tax rate structure).
440. See id. § 172.
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combined with the income tax deduction, is sufficient to forestall reductions in
employer-provided retiree health benefits. Medicare's prescription drug benefit
first became available in 2006, 44' so the results of this natural experiment are still
too tentative for a definitive assessment, but early returns are encouraging.
Kaiser/Hewitt surveyed private-sector employers with at least 1000 employees
who offered retiree health benefits in 2006.442 Of this group, only 8% of
employers terminated their drug coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees. 443 Fully
82% of employers surveyed offered prescription drug coverage that qualified for
the tax-free subsidy, and the remainder created a supplement or other type of
drug coverage.444 To be sure, this group of employers is a rarefied collection, but
they comprise 22% of all Fortune 500 companies and are the most likely to offer
retiree health benefits generally.445 This group indicated, moreover, that they
planned to maintain their existing arrangements for the near future,44 but there is
obviously no way to know for certain whether that will, in fact, be the case. Thus,
although Medicare's drug benefit might lead to further reductions in retiree
health benefits, the evidence available thus far suggests that the financial
incentives created to forestall such reductions have done so. Perhaps, similar
financial incentives for employers could be added to an early access Medicare
program to prevent or minimize reductions of employer-sponsored retiree health
benefit plans.
4. Potential Impact on Retirement Decisions
As noted at the outset of this Article,447 the availability of health insurance is
often a major factor in timing one's retirement. Indeed, one analyst has observed
that "[p]ension and retiree health benefits also have been used to encourage and
enable older workers to retire, to create openings for younger workers, and to
increase overall productivity., 448 This phenomenon, however, is not an unbridled
societal good. As the same analyst notes, when early retirement is facilitated,
"able-bodied workers are removed prematurely from the workplace, the tax base
is reduced, and the demand for public benefits is consequently increased., ,4 - The
essential question, therefore, is whether and to what extent early access to
441. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, § 101(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2071 (2003) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
101(a)(2)).
442. KAISER/HEWITT SURVEY, supra note 7, at 2.
443. Id. at 24.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 2.
446. Id. at 25.
447. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
448. Atkins, supra note 29, at 100, 109.
449. Id. at 120.
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Medicare would precipitate retirements that would not otherwise take place.
A comprehensive examination of continuation health insurance among men
aged fifty-five to sixty-four years suggests that the impact on induced retirement
is rather small. 450 The researchers looked at actual data and concluded that "one
year of [continuation health] coverage raised the probability of being retired by
about 1.1 percentage points.,, 451 Furthermore, such coverage apparently
"provide[d] insurance coverage for individuals who would have retired in the
absence of [such coverage] even though they would not have been covered by
employer-provided health insurance., 45 2 These authors admit, however, that
continuation health coverage is more expensive than retiree health insurance and
severely time-limited.453 Such insurance, in contrast, would be more likely to
affect retirement timing decisions, depending on the scope of its coverage.
454
A different study created a simulation model to examine this issue
theoretically. 4-5 According to the model-builders, the impact of lowering
Medicare's eligibility age to sixty-two "would raise retirement rates for both men
and women by 7%," a result that they characterized as "small. ' "4 56 The Medicare
early access proposal that they considered, however, did not apply to persons
younger than age sixty-two, so it is possible that the increase in retirement rates
might be larger if the eligibility age were fifty-five years instead. On the other
hand, the authors noted that "[t]he retirement effects of an expansion of the
Medicare program would be even smaller if near-elderly adults could obtain
Medicare coverage only by buying into the program and paying substantial
premiums. 45 7 Accordingly, if induced premature retirement is a major concern
of policymakers, they could adjust the effective cost-sharing ratio and make it
less generous than the 25-75 split that the current proposals envision.4 S While
hardly a perfect solution, such a trade-off might balance the need of older retirees
450. See Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance and EarhY Retirement.
Evidence from the Availability of Continuation Coverage, in ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
AGING 115 (David A. Wise ed., 1996).
451. Id. at 140.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 141.
454. See Janet Currie & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health, Health Insurance and the Labor Market,
in 3C HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3309, 3379 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999).
455. See Richard W. Johnson, Amy J. Davidoff & Kevin Perese, Health Insurance Costs and
Early Retirement Decisions, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 716 (2003).
456. Id. at 726; see also Melissa A. Boyle & Joanna N. Lahey, Health Insurance and the
Labor Supply Decisions of Older Workers: Evidence from the US. Department of Veteran Afairs
(Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Working Paper No. 2007-23, 2007), available at
http://www.bc.edu/crr (expansion of the Veterans Affairs health care system's coverage led to "a
2.3% increase in the probability that a treated individual reports being retired").
457. Johnson, supra note 455, at 726 (emphasis added).
458. See supra text accompanying notes 396-402.
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for some sort of reliable health insurance with society's desire to limit unintended
early retirements.
At bottom, of course, the timing of any individual's withdrawal from regular
employment is determined by many factors-both financial and nonfinancial.
And some particularly salient factors, such as overall health status,' 9 are largely
beyond the control of the prospective retiree. Nonetheless, the potential impact of
early access to Medicare on retirement, at least at the proverbial margin, cannot
be ignored.
CONCLUSION
The United States is presently in the midst of an unprecedented expansion of
its older population. The numbers of Americans in the "early" retiree cohort of
age fifty-five to sixty-four years and the "typical" retiree cohort of age sixty-five
and older are expected to increase dramatically, as Figure 2 indicates:
460
FIGURE 2: Projected Population (in Millions)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, "Projections of the Total Resident Population by 5-Year Age Groups and Sex with
Special Age Categories: Middle Series," selected years 2000 to 2030, January 2000.
For these two cohorts, employer-provided health insurance is an essential
459. See Johnson, supra note 455, at 726.
460. U.S. G-N, AcCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 21, at 18.
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pillar of their anticipated retirement, and especially so for the pre-sixty-five
group that generally cannot yet enroll in Medicare.
But the status of post-employment health benefits is already precarious and
likely to become even more precarious in the future. Premium increases and
benefit cutbacks, as well as outright plan terminations, have become
commonplace throughout the private sector and may start appearing among
public sector employers as well due to newly effective accounting disclosure
requirements. An important study of retiree health benefits concluded that
"[t]hese benefits should be viewed not as a gift but as a form of deferred
compensation which cannot be abrogated by the employer. '' 461 This Article has
demonstrated, however, that such abrogation is widespread and that legal
recourse has limited effect. Barring unusually restrictive contract language,
employers have been allowed to alter and even end retiree health benefits that
had been part of their firm's culture, literally, for generations.462
Into this abyss, Medicare appears as a distinctly "second best" solution. Age-
eligible retirees are almost always worse off with Medicare's disjointed multi-
faceted programs than they were under their former employer's retiree health
benefit plan.46  Like the old Catskills complaint about the food tasting terrible
and the portions being small, Medicare generally offers less coordination of
benefits, more complexity, and higher cost.
Retirees who are not yet age-eligible for Medicare, however, are in even
worse straits. Beyond limited continuation coverage, such retirees must try to
secure health insurance in the individual market, but there is a very high
likelihood that such coverage will be expensive, unaffordable, or unobtainable.
Health savings accounts have limited appeal to these retirees, as such accounts
must be accompanied by a "high-deductible" health insurance policy that may or
may not be available, depending upon medical underwriting criteria.
For this group, early access to Medicare is likely to be the better approach.
Cost considerations, possible crowd out of existing retiree health benefits, and
some impact on induced early retirement are certainly important issues to
address. But the essential feature of extending Medicare's universal health
coverage to persons younger than age sixty-five is an idea whose urgency has
only increased since it was first introduced a decade ago. Further delay is
461. FINKEL& RICHLIL..supra note 14, at 118.
462. See, e.g., Vanessa Fuhrmans & Theo Francis. Retiree Benefits Take Another Hit, WALL
ST. J., July 16, 2008, at D1 ("Even those who are in or near retirement shouldn't count on keeping
the company coverage they have built up.").
463. See DALE YAMAMOTO, TRICIA NEUMAN & MICHELLE KITCHMAN STROLLO, How DOES
THE BENEFIT VALUE OF MEDICARE COMPARE TO THE BENEFIT VALUE OF TYPICAL LARGE EMPLOYER
PL \NS? 3 (Kaiser Family Found., Medicare Issue Brief, 2008), available at http:t %www".kff.org;
medicare/upload/7768.pdf (finding that even with the new prescription drug benefit, Medicare's
benefit value is lower than the typical large employer plan by more than $1500).
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increasingly untenable and unwarranted.
The political climate for resolving this problem may, in fact, be at hand.
President Obama has declared that health care reform is an essential component
of the more general economic recovery effort, stating that reforming health care
is "not something that we can sort of put off because we're in an emergency. This
is part of the emergency. 464 Insuring the uninsured will likely be a major part of
this initiative, and the ranks of the uninsured include many early retirees.
Moreover, the chair of the Senate Finance Committee, which has jurisdiction
over the Medicare program, included early access to Medicare as part of his "Call
to Action: Health Reform 2009" white paper.465 This document is a high-concept
proposal with few specifics, but it explains that persons aged fifty-five to sixty-
four years "face greater risk of illness than their younger counterparts ... [but]
have fewer and fewer affordable insurance options. ' '466 The document proposes
that "Medicare would charge enrollees electing the buy-in option an annual
premium... [such] that the total costs for the buy-in population would be budget
neutral, 467 asserting that "this option would not create new costs for the
Medicare program or for taxpayers., 468 Perhaps under the new administration,
retirees younger than age sixty-five will finally see change they can believe in.
464. Transcript of Obama's Health Care Briefing, Dec. 11, 2008, http:/ xwxv.nytimes.com/
2008/12/1 1/us/politics/1 l text-obama.html?emc=etal (last visited Apr. 20, 2009); see also Jonathan
Gruber, Universal Health Insurance Coverage or Economic Relief-A False Choice, 360 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 437, 439 (2009) (noting that -'universal health coverage for our citizens, can improve
both individual health and the economy's health, both today and in the long run").
465. MAx BAUCUS, CALL TO ACTION: HEALTH REFORM 2009, at 21-22 (2008), available at
http://finance.scnate.gov/healthreform2009/finalwhitepaper.pdf
466. Id. at 21.
467. Id. at 21-22.
468. Id. at 22.
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